6 ms·
My solution is to encode the swapping in the placement algorithm so that any pair of students can be swapped if they both get a more preferred school. This way
by karmakaze 9y ago
My solution is to encode the swapping in the placement algorithm so that any pair of students can be swapped if they both get a more preferred school. This way you eliminate the gaming aspect since you can't later decide that you want to trade for a school lower on your list. Simple. Fair.
- dshields1 9y ago> any pair of students can be swapped if they both get a more preferred school. This is the meaning of stable in the stable marriage problem. And the Gale-Shapley algorithm does this.
- karmakaze 9y agoThe important part is that the algorithm is applied by the system without human interaction after the initial input of preferences. Placements are still final.
- rzwitserloot 9y agoI'm not so sure. I haven't done the math but I think you can strategize here: pick your #1 preference as #1 on your list... But then put the most popular school as your #2 (instead of your personal actual second preference). Odds that you end up getting picked by the algorithm for a mutually beneficial trade is high.