4 ms·

I think there's a subtext to all of this where the NSA is dismissive of, well, basically all academic cryptanalytic work. The converse of that, of academics and

I think there's a subtext to all of this where the NSA is dismissive of, well, basically all academic cryptanalytic work. The converse of that, of academics and the NSA, didn't (I think?) used to be true, but might gradually be taking this shape, so that the two groups are just mutually dismissive of each other. This isn't new. My paper about exploiting shared caches in Intel Hyperthreading as a side channel to steal an RSA key was rejected by the Cryptology ePrint archive "because it wasn't about cryptology", while some people in the computer security community dismissed it as "just a theoretical cryptography thing".

garmaine 8y ago
Are you claiming to have prior knowledge and academic precedent for Meltdown?
- deleted 8y ago
  [deleted]
- girvo 8y ago
  A couple of people do, if I recall correctly.
  - Bartweiss 8y ago
    I definitely remember rumblings about "Branch prediction runs code outside normal execution? There's got to be a security hole there somewhere." That sentiment was common enough that it's certainly not hard to imagine someone sketching the shape of an actual attack with it before the detailed proof came down the line.
- lifeisstillgood 8y ago
  Basically, yes :-) https://www.daemonology.net/hyperthreading-considered-harmful/ https://www.daemonology.net/hyperthreading-considered-harmfu... http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2018-01-17-some-thoughts-on-spectre-and-meltdown.html http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2018-01-17-some-thoughts-on-... A 2005 paper presented is linked, where he demonstrated such an attack and worked with the usual people to implement fixes. In fairness to cperciva he clearly distinguished his work from Meltdown/Spectre - "These new attacks use the same basic mechanism, but exploit an entirely new angle." I think that since the world was surprised by how bad it really was in practise, its fair to say cperciva (as well as others) predicted the explosion, but not necessarily the timing or the blast radius. There are I am sure many other papers in corners of the net that explain the next one to come bite us. PS cperciva was the Security Officer for FreeBSD and tends to know more about this stuff than the average bear. (Again HN shows its ability to have someone with truly detailed knowledge just one comment away.) NB _ I may have some details wrong, please correct if needed.
WhitneyLand 8y ago
[My paper about exploiting shared caches in Intel Hyperthreading to steal an RSA key was rejected by the Cryptology ePrint archive "because it wasn't about cryptology"] Why shouldn’t it have been rejected? I can’t see how it was about cryptography either as they seem to define it based on the center of gravity of their papers: https://eprint.iacr.org/2004 https://eprint.iacr.org/2004 Separately, if what you said about the security community downplaying your results as too theoretical was not just the occasional opinion of a maverick, then clearly that was incorrect and unfortunate in multiple ways. Finally regardless of any of that, great work on your contributions. Nice insights and efforts, coming so early on in the lifespan of an important problem.
- cperciva 8y ago
  I can’t see how it was about cryptography either as they seem to define it based on the center of gravity of their papers: https://eprint.iacr.org/2004* https://eprint.iacr.org/2004* A quick search shows eight papers which have "side channel" in their titles, so I think it's a bit of a stretch to say that they don't consider side channel attacks to be cryptography...
  - WhitneyLand 8y ago
    I was trying to guess that 2004 was the most proximate archive year of their papers prior to when yours was rejected, hence that list: https://eprint.iacr.org/2004 https://eprint.iacr.org/2004 Are you saying any of these papers make a significant argument about side channel attacks? Or of you saying there are eight papers that make some reference to it? If it’s the latter that’s quite a big difference and it’s easy to see the logic of rejecting your paper based on its central theme. I didn’t notice any of the papers made a significant argument about side channel attacks. Maybe 2004 was not the most proximate year prior to take as sample data? Or maybe I’m just overlooking the eight your referring to? Btw I wouldn’t begrudge you any wtf thinking if you had any. It would definitely suck to do good work and not get proper and timely recognition for it, especially when it could have sped a solution or helped mitigate a real life problem. It’s just that to whatever degree this suckness happened, I can’t see how it was due to irrational or biased reasoning on the part of the Cryptology ePrint archive.

garmaine 8y ago

Are you claiming to have prior knowledge and academic precedent for Meltdown?

deleted 8y ago
[deleted]
girvo 8y ago
A couple of people do, if I recall correctly.
- Bartweiss 8y ago
  I definitely remember rumblings about "Branch prediction runs code outside normal execution? There's got to be a security hole there somewhere." That sentiment was common enough that it's certainly not hard to imagine someone sketching the shape of an actual attack with it before the detailed proof came down the line.
lifeisstillgood 8y ago
Basically, yes :-) https://www.daemonology.net/hyperthreading-considered-harmful/ https://www.daemonology.net/hyperthreading-considered-harmfu... http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2018-01-17-some-thoughts-on-spectre-and-meltdown.html http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2018-01-17-some-thoughts-on-... A 2005 paper presented is linked, where he demonstrated such an attack and worked with the usual people to implement fixes. In fairness to cperciva he clearly distinguished his work from Meltdown/Spectre - "These new attacks use the same basic mechanism, but exploit an entirely new angle." I think that since the world was surprised by how bad it really was in practise, its fair to say cperciva (as well as others) predicted the explosion, but not necessarily the timing or the blast radius. There are I am sure many other papers in corners of the net that explain the next one to come bite us. PS cperciva was the Security Officer for FreeBSD and tends to know more about this stuff than the average bear. (Again HN shows its ability to have someone with truly detailed knowledge just one comment away.) NB _ I may have some details wrong, please correct if needed.

WhitneyLand 8y ago

[My paper about exploiting shared caches in Intel Hyperthreading to steal an RSA key was rejected by the Cryptology ePrint archive "because it wasn't about cryptology"] Why shouldn’t it have been rejected? I can’t see how it was about cryptography either as they seem to define it based on the center of gravity of their papers: https://eprint.iacr.org/2004 https://eprint.iacr.org/2004 Separately, if what you said about the security community downplaying your results as too theoretical was not just the occasional opinion of a maverick, then clearly that was incorrect and unfortunate in multiple ways. Finally regardless of any of that, great work on your contributions. Nice insights and efforts, coming so early on in the lifespan of an important problem.

cperciva 8y ago
I can’t see how it was about cryptography either as they seem to define it based on the center of gravity of their papers: https://eprint.iacr.org/2004* https://eprint.iacr.org/2004* A quick search shows eight papers which have "side channel" in their titles, so I think it's a bit of a stretch to say that they don't consider side channel attacks to be cryptography...
- WhitneyLand 8y ago
  I was trying to guess that 2004 was the most proximate archive year of their papers prior to when yours was rejected, hence that list: https://eprint.iacr.org/2004 https://eprint.iacr.org/2004 Are you saying any of these papers make a significant argument about side channel attacks? Or of you saying there are eight papers that make some reference to it? If it’s the latter that’s quite a big difference and it’s easy to see the logic of rejecting your paper based on its central theme. I didn’t notice any of the papers made a significant argument about side channel attacks. Maybe 2004 was not the most proximate year prior to take as sample data? Or maybe I’m just overlooking the eight your referring to? Btw I wouldn’t begrudge you any wtf thinking if you had any. It would definitely suck to do good work and not get proper and timely recognition for it, especially when it could have sped a solution or helped mitigate a real life problem. It’s just that to whatever degree this suckness happened, I can’t see how it was due to irrational or biased reasoning on the part of the Cryptology ePrint archive.