4 ms·

The way it's supposed to work is that they try to have the best code cracking, and then they want everyone to use the second best codes so no one else can crack

The way it's supposed to work is that they try to have the best code cracking, and then they want everyone to use the second best codes so no one else can crack code. If they aren't the best the plan can't work and you get junk like clipper chip or whatever it was called.

bluGill 8y ago
IT is a little more complex than that - they need to also figure out what codes the US government uses for classified secrets that we don't won't other countries to find. It is not clear how they resolve the inherent conflict in these goals.
- rocqua 8y ago
  For these ciphers, it seems less likely that NSA has a backdoor that no-one else could find. Notably in the case of dual-EC there was a recommended curve chosen by the NSA. That was easy to backdoor by knowing how the curve was generated.
  - tptacek 8y ago
    More importantly, pretty much the whole point of a PKRNG is to make the random state recoverable. It's not as if competing RNGs have designs that enable the kind of backdoor Dual EC does. That's what was so weird about it, and why there was some doubt about what it was --- not doubt that people should use Dual EC (of course they shouldn't, and it's been amazing to see companies like RSA and Juniper actually adopt it; the cryptographic incompetence behind those decisions was shocking), but that NSA could really be using such blatantly awful tradecraft.
vertexFarm 8y ago
Anyone who falls for this kind of reasoning is incredibly naive. If you ever hear that somebody has a plan to have the best offense and make sure that everyone else has the second-best defense so they're the only ones who can do something bad, the first thing that should come to your mind is that they are planning to do something bad. It's not an "will they" situation. It's a "can they" situation. If they have the capability, they will do it. That is a terrible plan. And don't tell me that they are on our side so it's okay. Secretive, crypto-state actors are on their own side. Ask yourself: if this power eventually falls under the unilateral control of the executive branch, will that always be a good thing under any conceivable future administration? Believing the justifications is extremely dangerous.
- mcny 8y ago
  This seems like a very easy problem to fix. We can split NSA into two and now the defensive people are not tainted by the people trying to break into everything. I mean the defensive people can focus on trying to secure everything, everywhere and against everyone including their former coworkers. Is this too naive?
  - noir_lord 8y ago
    I don't think it's naive and would likely be better than the current system where the poachers are way more heavily supported than the gamekeepers. I mean it's not like division of intelligence agencies is anything new (FBI for counter-intelligence, CIA for foreign-intelligence etc). Of course to make it work you'd need a watchdog with actual teeth and historically the NSA has regarded oversight as well something they think they don't need or want.
  - derefr 8y ago
    I think the practical barrier in the way of this is that one of the main ways the NSA “invents” new Suite A ciphers is by the cryptanalysis of cryptosystems of foreign militaries. The “defending the US” job is a consequence of the “attacking others” job; the crypto experts got to be crypto experts by breaking rival crypto. This is also, in large part, why these cipher suites are classified—not because declassifying them would make them easier to cryptanalyze; but because it would tip off foreign powers that the US knows how their crypto works! (And this is, of course, just as true of other weapons-systems development projects as it is of state-run cryptosystem developments.)

bluGill 8y ago

IT is a little more complex than that - they need to also figure out what codes the US government uses for classified secrets that we don't won't other countries to find. It is not clear how they resolve the inherent conflict in these goals.

rocqua 8y ago
For these ciphers, it seems less likely that NSA has a backdoor that no-one else could find. Notably in the case of dual-EC there was a recommended curve chosen by the NSA. That was easy to backdoor by knowing how the curve was generated.
- tptacek 8y ago
  More importantly, pretty much the whole point of a PKRNG is to make the random state recoverable. It's not as if competing RNGs have designs that enable the kind of backdoor Dual EC does. That's what was so weird about it, and why there was some doubt about what it was --- not doubt that people should use Dual EC (of course they shouldn't, and it's been amazing to see companies like RSA and Juniper actually adopt it; the cryptographic incompetence behind those decisions was shocking), but that NSA could really be using such blatantly awful tradecraft.

vertexFarm 8y ago

Anyone who falls for this kind of reasoning is incredibly naive. If you ever hear that somebody has a plan to have the best offense and make sure that everyone else has the second-best defense so they're the only ones who can do something bad, the first thing that should come to your mind is that they are planning to do something bad. It's not an "will they" situation. It's a "can they" situation. If they have the capability, they will do it. That is a terrible plan. And don't tell me that they are on our side so it's okay. Secretive, crypto-state actors are on their own side. Ask yourself: if this power eventually falls under the unilateral control of the executive branch, will that always be a good thing under any conceivable future administration? Believing the justifications is extremely dangerous.

mcny 8y ago
This seems like a very easy problem to fix. We can split NSA into two and now the defensive people are not tainted by the people trying to break into everything. I mean the defensive people can focus on trying to secure everything, everywhere and against everyone including their former coworkers. Is this too naive?
- noir_lord 8y ago
  I don't think it's naive and would likely be better than the current system where the poachers are way more heavily supported than the gamekeepers. I mean it's not like division of intelligence agencies is anything new (FBI for counter-intelligence, CIA for foreign-intelligence etc). Of course to make it work you'd need a watchdog with actual teeth and historically the NSA has regarded oversight as well something they think they don't need or want.
- derefr 8y ago
  I think the practical barrier in the way of this is that one of the main ways the NSA “invents” new Suite A ciphers is by the cryptanalysis of cryptosystems of foreign militaries. The “defending the US” job is a consequence of the “attacking others” job; the crypto experts got to be crypto experts by breaking rival crypto. This is also, in large part, why these cipher suites are classified—not because declassifying them would make them easier to cryptanalyze; but because it would tip off foreign powers that the US knows how their crypto works! (And this is, of course, just as true of other weapons-systems development projects as it is of state-run cryptosystem developments.)