>Yes, us head-in-the-clouds idealists with our pie-eyed demands that encrypted message protocols not leak the contents of our messages to anyone who can interce

>Yes, us head-in-the-clouds idealists with our pie-eyed demands that encrypted message protocols not leak the contents of our messages to anyone who can intercept them. That's not what you're demanding. You're demanding the end to a UX. That's entirely orthogonal to security, and my whole point is that's very different from pushing people to go from an insecure version of a UX to a more secure version of a UX (or at least a strict superset of that UX). It's straight forward to argue "don't use HTTP, use HTTPS", or "don't use SMS, use {secure messenger}"[1], or "don't use POP, use POPS or IMAPS" or even "don't use an 8 character password that is the name of your dog on a website, use something random and preferably a password manager". But that's not your argument. 1. Though again, the basic fact that I can't just tell anyone in the world, on any device at all, what {secure messenger} vs "SMS" should be is inherently suboptimal though less so.