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It took me a good amount of googling to verify that, but you're mostly correct, there are only 132 developers with upload rights to the universe repository. Tho

It took me a good amount of googling to verify that, but you're mostly correct, there are only 132 developers with upload rights to the universe repository. Though I would argue that the distinction isn't just licensing, since Canonical themselves only support main and restricted.

geofft 8y ago
I mean that the distinction between main and restricted and between universe and multiverse is licensing. It's a 2x2 matrix: supported only community free main universe non-FOSS restricted multiverse
- Shikadi 8y ago
  Oh yeah, definitely misread that
cookiecaper 8y ago
Universe is Canonical's dumping ground. There are millions of vulnerable Redis instances in production today because Ubuntu doesn't feel inclined to issue an update for a major CVE affecting the redis-server package shipped for 14.04. There's multiple layers of problems here, because as we see with Ubuntu, just because the code was built and uploaded by a trustworthy person doesn't mean it's automatically safe or secure (especially for more nefarious infections that bury themselves deep in the source tree). Remember the pwnage that brought down kernel.org for a few months? That was only a few years ago, but the infiltration had been quite serious, and if I recall correctly, there was some concern that infected code had made it into officially distributed tarballs. In practice, I don't know that the distinction between distributing packages that are trivially exploitable and distributing packages that have exploits pre-baked in is really that big of a difference. Automated scanners often pick up and automatically exploit exposed instances within a few days. What it boils down to is that admins need to take responsibility for their own workload and what they choose to execute, no matter the guarantees of the distributor or the claims that $Sandbox_Y is magically impenetrable (which was silly enough before, but completely farcical in a post-Spectre world).

geofft 8y ago

I mean that the distinction between main and restricted and between universe and multiverse is licensing. It's a 2x2 matrix: supported only community free main universe non-FOSS restricted multiverse

Shikadi 8y ago
Oh yeah, definitely misread that

cookiecaper 8y ago

Universe is Canonical's dumping ground. There are millions of vulnerable Redis instances in production today because Ubuntu doesn't feel inclined to issue an update for a major CVE affecting the redis-server package shipped for 14.04. There's multiple layers of problems here, because as we see with Ubuntu, just because the code was built and uploaded by a trustworthy person doesn't mean it's automatically safe or secure (especially for more nefarious infections that bury themselves deep in the source tree). Remember the pwnage that brought down kernel.org for a few months? That was only a few years ago, but the infiltration had been quite serious, and if I recall correctly, there was some concern that infected code had made it into officially distributed tarballs. In practice, I don't know that the distinction between distributing packages that are trivially exploitable and distributing packages that have exploits pre-baked in is really that big of a difference. Automated scanners often pick up and automatically exploit exposed instances within a few days. What it boils down to is that admins need to take responsibility for their own workload and what they choose to execute, no matter the guarantees of the distributor or the claims that $Sandbox_Y is magically impenetrable (which was silly enough before, but completely farcical in a post-Spectre world).