3 ms·
That's one possible fix for timing attacks in general cited in this paper (section 6), though not their preferred one: http://www.usenix.org/events/sec03/tech/b
by _delirium 16y ago
That's one possible fix for timing attacks in general cited in this paper (section 6), though not their preferred one: http://www.usenix.org/events/sec03/tech/brumley/brumley_html/index.html http://www.usenix.org/events/sec03/tech/brumley/brumley_html...
- tptacek 16y agoIt's pretty much the hardest possible way to implement timing-independent crypto operations: enlist the operating system to enforce worst-case behavior, every time. You are far more likely to slip up with this countermeasure than you are to slip up by swapping in timing-independent routines. The fact that you have to enforce timing-independence across multiple operations is one of the reasons that libraries that expose (or directly make use of) crypto primitives, like AES-CBC or HMAC-SHA1, are evil: the joints where those things meet are also fraught with trouble.
- deleted 16y ago[deleted]