4 ms·
It's not, you're misunderstanding and spreading misinformation. The "key to the kingdom" is a random asymmetric keypair. The PIN is only there as a second facto
by StavrosK 9y ago
It's not, you're misunderstanding and spreading misinformation. The "key to the kingdom" is a random asymmetric keypair. The PIN is only there as a second factor to this key to prevent physically stolen keys being used to authenticate. If you enter the PIN wrong five times, the device can just lock itself.
There might be a way to steal the PIN if the user enters it on a compromised machine, but you can't do anything with the PIN. You need the physical device as well.
- not_that_noob 9y agoI think you misunderstand how the CTAP portion of Webauthn works - once the root credential authenticates the user, they no longer have to use passwords for the user’s various accounts. The simple point is that if this credential became compromised for whatever reason, then all associated accounts are by definition compromised.
- StavrosK 9y agoYes, certainly. And in order to compromise that root credential, you'd have to physically steal the key, and either decap the chip and read the bits somehow, or find a vulnerability that allowed you to read the private keys through USB. Needless to say, this is much, much harder than stealing someone's password.
- not_that_noob 9y agoCredential reissue (lost token) would be a much easier path for an attacker. The weakest point is always the point of compromise. For the smart attacker therefore, they have been handed the whole set of accounts. So yes the original point stands - attackers will find it more lucrative to do account compromise in the Webauthn world.
- StavrosK 9y agoHow would an attack without having the hardware key work?
- not_that_noob 9y agoThey might call in and say they lost their token, and a competent attacker will usually have all the necessary info. Happens all the time with credit card fraud. Sure, you can notify the target that a credential was reissued, but that happens with credit cards too, and most of the time people don’t pay attention. About 15% of the user population really cares about security and will take the right precautions. It’s the other 85% that are soft targets that keep attackers in business.
- StavrosK 9y agoOkay, but how is that the key's fault? This has literally nothing to do with the authentication method, it doesn't give you access to any other site or anything. It's just a social engineering attack on the service, and it's pretty much the only one left because everything else has been obsoleted by the use of hardware tokens for auth.
- not_that_noob 9y agoNot finding fault. The point of Webauthn is convenience - but the trade off is that if CTAP is compromised, it’s convenient for the attacker too.
- StavrosK 9y agoI don't see how that's different from passwords, though. If your password gets compromised, it's game over as well, and it's much easier to compromise that.
- emlun 9y agoI think you misunderstand how WebAuthn works - see my other reply to your previous message.
- emlun 9y agoWait a second. Web Authentication is not an SSO framework - there's no "root credential". Each server you use the token on gets its own keypair which is used for only that site. It seems like the scenario you're describing in further replies is this: 1) Alice has an account at service A and an account at service B, and authenticates to both with the same FIDO2 token. 2) Eve calls service A and convinces them she's Alice and needs a new token. 3) Service A sends Eve a new token registered to Alice's account. 4) Eve uses the new token to log in as Alice at service B. The above attack is not possible, since the keypair for service A is not usable at service B. This separation of credentials for separate services is a fundamental FIDO/WebAuthn design feature for damage control and user privacy. Eve can use the new token to log in to service A, yes, but only to service A. Even if service A and service B were to try to cooperate out-of-band to support each other's credentials, the browser would not let them unless they're on the same domain.
- not_that_noob 9y agoSee CTAP in FIDO2 - something needs to determine you are the user before opening up the key set. The attack point will be at this step.
- emlun 9y agoI'm sorry, I don't understand at all what you mean by that.