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I agree. I think people miss your point that within their respective contexts Newton and Einstein were rejecting a form of an acausal theory. However, there is
by dmfdmf 8y ago
I agree. I think people miss your point that within their respective contexts Newton and Einstein were rejecting a form of an acausal theory. However, there is a significant philosophic difference in Newton's era vs Einstein's. Newton was honest in his writing essentially admitting defeat in solving how gravity could work instantaneously across space but nevertheless the math works. In contrast, today the physicists (and philosophers) claim not only does the math work but it proves that reality is fundamentally acausal, or probabilistic, etc. which are various forms of denying identity.
In my view, the crude circularity at the root of physics (which leads to multiple conundrums) is the assumption that the "speed" of light can be measured when measurement presupposes light (or its E/M equivalents).[1] Light is special in this regards.
[1] https://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/3104 https://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/3104
- goatlover 8y ago> not only does the math work but it proves that reality is fundamentally acausal, or probabilistic, etc. which are various forms of denying identity. Proves, as in all deterministic interpretations of QM are impossible? What about MWI? Also, the wavefunction itself is deterministic. Maybe reality isn't fundamentally particle-like, but field-like.
- dmfdmf 8y ago> Maybe reality isn't fundamentally particle-like, but field-like. But then we get into metaphysical and epistemological questions which are obviously unavoidable once you start making claims about what is or is not "fundamental". This is because "fundamental" has to include both the nature of reality and our means of perceiving it. It is common today to project how we perceive onto what we perceive but they must be distinct in any valid theory. Claiming that reality itself is probabilistic is one example of this projection, though it may very well be a fundamental limit of our means of perception it is not a property of what we perceive.