3 ms·

Are there any initiatives out there that offer training/guidance in designing systems where even if someone's credentials are compromised, it doesn't really mat

by u801e 9y ago

Are there any initiatives out there that offer training/guidance in designing systems where even if someone's credentials are compromised, it doesn't really matter. When there are systems out there that still store passwords in an insecure manner and don't require a second form of authentication, then all the training in the world about password hygiene and recognizing phishing attempts won't fix the actual problem.

zephharben 9y ago
"security in depth". This is the kind of problem that can't be solved via specific technology choices, or technical standards. Instead, it's a matter of understanding that most attacks involve several pivot points; and that these pivots are possible because we treat internal networks as if they are "safe spaces" where we can let our guard down.
fjsolwmv 9y ago
In the research this is called "capabilities", limiting your account, not giving everyone root. Also, there is fraud detection, stuff like automatic alerts when the same credential is used in two places at once, or with unusual access patterns. Obviously it's impossible for compromising credentials to have no consequences -- if case, why do you have credentials?
- u801e 9y ago
  > Obviously it's impossible for compromising credentials to have no consequences -- if case, why do you have credentials? For systems that only require a username and password to log in, someone else obtaining/guessing my credentials would have the consequence of someone being able to access my account. But if there's a second credential I have to enter in addition to the username and password, then someone trying to use the username and password alone would not be able to access the account. Where I work, this second credential is the RSA token along with a PIN. But this could also be accomplished by using a client side TLS certificate on the work provided device or U2F with a work issued Yubi key.

by u801e 9y ago

zephharben 9y ago

"security in depth". This is the kind of problem that can't be solved via specific technology choices, or technical standards. Instead, it's a matter of understanding that most attacks involve several pivot points; and that these pivots are possible because we treat internal networks as if they are "safe spaces" where we can let our guard down.

fjsolwmv 9y ago

In the research this is called "capabilities", limiting your account, not giving everyone root. Also, there is fraud detection, stuff like automatic alerts when the same credential is used in two places at once, or with unusual access patterns. Obviously it's impossible for compromising credentials to have no consequences -- if case, why do you have credentials?

u801e 9y ago
> Obviously it's impossible for compromising credentials to have no consequences -- if case, why do you have credentials? For systems that only require a username and password to log in, someone else obtaining/guessing my credentials would have the consequence of someone being able to access my account. But if there's a second credential I have to enter in addition to the username and password, then someone trying to use the username and password alone would not be able to access the account. Where I work, this second credential is the RSA token along with a PIN. But this could also be accomplished by using a client side TLS certificate on the work provided device or U2F with a work issued Yubi key.