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I assume the goal is to prevent the OS from needing to know the key.
by amluto 9y ago
I assume the goal is to prevent the OS from needing to know the key.
- gruez 9y agowhat's the problem with letting the OS know the key? it already has access to all the files! the only use i can think of is some sort of multi-user system where you can't trust the kernel, but if you can't trust the kernel, it's already game over.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- mehrdada 9y ago> what's the problem with letting the OS know the key? it already has access to all the files! How about when your device is locked in sleep mode. The main processor should lose the key to a certain set of files, as does on iOS.
- gruez 9y agothat's more of an argument for encrypting filesystem instead of full disk encryption (which I agree would help in that situation), not an argument for having a custom security co-processor. you can accomplish the same thing with TPM: by using PCR sealed keys for the OS files, PCR + password sealed keys for private/personal files, and wiping the second set of keys every time you lock the computer.
- mbreese 9y agoI'd assume the goal would be to allow macOS to support secure data access with a processor that doesn't necessarily have a TPM. (Assuming you could do the exact same things with a TPM) As for what kind of hardware that might be (ahem ARM) would just be speculation... The dedicated T2 chip gives Apple more flexibility for the future and control over the present. Both of these things Apple values.