6 ms·
The unique pairing here provides some very important security properties that prevent the memory chips that comprise the SSD itself from being physically remove
by userbinator 9y ago
The unique pairing here provides some very important security properties that prevent the memory chips that comprise the SSD itself from being physically removed from the system and connected to a different system, or from having their contents extracted from the chips and flashed onto SSD chips in another system.
Yet more sadness for data recovery companies and those who've lost files and want their services. Full disk encryption has been around for a long time and, well-implemented, will let you recover the encrypted data to transfer to new media (so the DR company can't see your secrets either, but you haven't lost anything.)
IMHO encryption should be opt-in --- contrary to what those advocating it think, not every piece of data I have needs to be encrypted, and I certainly have plenty more personal files that I would rather have become publicly accessible than lost forever. It's a tradeoff between "if someone hacks in, they can read my data too" and "if something goes wrong, no one can read my data, including myself" and I think this tradeoff needs to be a more explicit choice.
- nvk 9y agoPut that data in a separate drive then, all the rest should be encrypted by default.
- chejazi 9y agoIn general, lack of encryption enables passive surveillance. I think a better solution than opt-in encryption could be on-by-default, with a multi-party recovery scheme.
- eli 9y agoDoesn't Windows have an option to have Microsoft keep a key in escrow? Seems like a reasonable compromise for most people.
- eat_veggies 9y agoYes, you can attach your Bitlocker recovery keys to your Microsoft account. I trust them well enough, since my threat model doesn't include state actors or MS themselves--if they really wanted my data, they could just ship an update to my machine while everything's decrypted anyway.
- fowl2 9y agoFileVault has this option too, at least on the Mac Mini I have.
- cbhl 9y agoI can't imagine Apple offering this option -- it doesn't really align with their strengths (privacy first) and weaknesses (data centers). They'd need to fix so much of iCloud first.
- kalleboo 9y agohttps://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204837 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204837 > If you're using OS X Yosemite or later, you can choose to use your iCloud account to unlock your disk and reset your password > If you're using OS X Mavericks, you can choose to store a FileVault recovery key with Apple by providing the questions and answers to three security questions. Choose answers that you're sure to remember > If you don't want to use iCloud FileVault recovery, you can create a local recovery key. Keep the letters and numbers of the key somewhere safe—other than on your encrypted startup disk
- locked0ut 9y agoIf you've ever messed up with an encrypted disk, you know it feels just like an unrecoverable hard drive crash. Which is exactly what it's supposed to feel like, and that's fine if you were aiming for it, but when that isn't what you signed up for, it's pretty much the worst thing ever. It can also feel like a truly nefarious form of vendor lock-in, if you ever try to migrate to another system, and just happen to notice that now, your disk is totally unmountable for some unexplainable reason. This kind of thing can happen when crossing over to an older version of an alternative OS that doesn't know how to negotiate authentication for proprietary encryption formats, or newer formats that weren't supported at the time of the older OS's install. So, for consumer hardware that might be received as a birthday gift, I'd say encrypted by default is a terrible idea. For those not carefully and explicitly warned, storing their stuff on an encrypted disk gone wrong, can be like unintentionally throwing it in the trash, setting it on fire and then flushing it down the toilet, except the toilet is a black hole of no return.
- mbreese 9y agoif you ever try to migrate to another system We're talking about an Apple iMac Pro here... this isn't a computer that is designed to allow you to move components to a different system. Yes, it is a fully locked-in system, purposefully designed to be as secure as possible. I'm not going to give Apple much grief about that, because it's not like they say you can migrate hardware from one system to the next. It would be more interesting to know how the T2 chip interacts with external storage and/or alternative (Windows/Bootcamp) operating systems. In both of these cases, one would expect more low-level data portability, which is a more interesting use-case than trying to pull out the NVMe SSDs from a glued together iMac.
- scarface74 9y agohttps://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208330 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208330
- myrandomcomment 9y agoGiven how simple something like TimeMachine is, a long with a host of web options people really have no excuse anymore. I have everything backed up to a TimeMachine and just for good measure everything also goes to Backblaze. I do not even have to think about it.
- closeparen 9y agoRecovery services are not a good backup plan. If you care about your data, you need to be storing it in multiple places.
- gambiting 9y agoYes, absolutely, 100% agreed. But in real life accidents happen and it's nice to at least have an option of emergency recovery. I'd trade that possibility for extra security, but I suspect most people would not. I think doing it like iPhones do it, where all storage is non-recoverable BUT everything is backed up by default is the best user experience.
- Twisell 9y agoIt isn’t backed up unless you opt-in for iCloud backup (which is largely encouraged) or perform a regular manual backup using iTunes. This is largely similar for MacOS with Time-Machine backup (largely encouraged) or iCloud backup (still recent and for now advertised as secondary backup) or a full disk dump by any software you deem appropriate. I both case the iCloud back-up seems to be the backup method Apple want to promote moving forward. And while I was very reticent for a while, this ultimately is a good move on their part IMHO (tho I’ll personally never stop full disk physical backup). Yes it’s pricy but keeping external hard-drive to date with tech also have a cost beyond initial buying cost (FW->USB2->USB-C HD->SSD) also it’s off site wich need some discipline if you do it yourself. For most users paying a monthly fee to have you mind worry free will be a blessing.
- chrisfinazzo 9y agoThis is pretty much my setup, and one of these days I'll convert the rest of the family. The odds of your local backup and cloud provider going down simultaneously are slim to none, and at that point I'd start looking out for the Four Horsemen.
- dbbk 9y agoYou can't do a full Mac backup to iCloud though can you?
- jchw 9y agoObviously, not everything on a drive is important to keep; in fact, I'd guess that maybe under 10% of a typical user's disk drive is data they would be impacted by if they lost it. Decrypting 100% of the data so that 10% of it is easier to recover at the cost of security seems like a bad idea. Information that would not really be considered 'confidential' could still be used to violate users privacy, including caches, cookies, password hashes, and so forth. In an era where mundane parties like border agents are malicious actors, this becomes more important to the average joe. If we want to reduce pain points for average users, the best case scenario would be to have intuitive means to allow users to ensure their data is safe and secure, and handled with an appropriate level of privacy (i.e. Tax documents should not be public.) If you can't accomplish that, it feels like all you can do is go back and forth between bad trade-offs.
- ClassyJacket 9y agoAny data you don't want to be lost forever should be backed up.
- peterburkimsher 9y agoBackups are opt-in. Encryption is opt-out. Users will just go for the easy, cheap, default option, and lose their data. That is not ok. I had to recover data for a friend whose MacBook Air failed halfway through the macOS update that reformatted her drive to APFS. I wrote up the process on Medium. If the drive weren't encrypted, it would've been possible to recover from more serious problems (e.g. partial flash memory failure) instead of just the OS issue. Thankfully her files were safe, but the fail-deadly default option for users' data is going to cause a lot of problems for Apple's reputation in future. https://medium.com/@peterburkimsher/saving-a-friend-with-apfs-data-recovery-89cffaabdadd https://medium.com/@peterburkimsher/saving-a-friend-with-apf...
- rimliu 9y agoBrushing your teeth is also opt-in. But also just a part of basic hygiene. Backups should be no different, especially when doing them with Time Machine is even less trouble than brushing you teeth.
- thisacctforreal 9y agoI think full disk encryption with a plaintext keyfile in the boot partition is a good minimum. To erase the drive; securely delete the key and all copies.
- csomar 9y agoI don't know. I think security should come first. Also Apple makes it stupidly and unrealistically simple to backup your macos. I remember when it was a pain to backup my windows and having to run through all the files. But Apple's Time Machine is really spectacular at that.
- alerighi 9y agoAlso encryption done well should not rely on some particular hardware being closed or the algorithm secrete, like this system does, but only on the secrete that the user know, the password or other authentication methods. Like disk encryption with Linux, you select a robust password, or you can store a key in whatever way you want, you enter your password on boot and unlock the disk, if you PC broke, fine remove the disk from the computer and put it in another. The security lies only in the password you choose, not your particular PC having some kind of closed hardware in which somewhere lies the key (of course).