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" then a full VM is your only guarantee" VM's on commercial and FOSS platforms have been unable to ensure security as far back as first pentest of VM/370. They
by nickpsecurity 9y ago
" then a full VM is your only guarantee"
VM's on commercial and FOSS platforms have been unable to ensure security as far back as first pentest of VM/370. They were too complicated depending on a lot of privileged code. The founders of INFOSEC took aim at it with KVM/370 and VAX VMM Security Kernel. One example (see esp layering and assurance sections):
http://lukemuehlhauser.com/wp-content/uploads/Karger-et-al-A-retrospective-on-the-VAX-VMM-security-kernel.pdf http://lukemuehlhauser.com/wp-content/uploads/Karger-et-al-A...
Even those systems had too much complexity by our standards. They aimed for nearly-perfect implementation of the core kernels mediating everything. That led to separation kernels like INTEGRITY-178B, LynxSecure, seL4, and Muen. They're usually just 4-12Kloc. Whereas, projects trying to achieve similar assurance activities on KVM and Xen mostly gave up due to complexity. If aiming for correctness more than security, projects like Nova microhypervisor and GenodeOS show similar partitioning can still help.
Although separation kernels succeeded, their requirements assumed hardware/firmware that was sane and would work correctly. What people are using for virtualized workloads has been overly complex with shoddy implementations. Bypasses keep happening via everything from CPU's to RAM to peripheral firmware. Although methods exist to assure them, the companies providing them are not using them.
So, if you want anything close to a guarantee, you have to use physical separation with strongly-mediated, communications systems over optical links. The boards need to be electrically isolated from each other in their own TEMPEST boxes or safes. Alternatively, use old technique from separation kernel era of putting all the complex, enemy-facing stuff on their own boxes that interpret stuff down to requests in simple protocols interfacing with the trusted boxes on better hardware. Reduces hardware cost but what you get is nothing like a Google or Amazon cloud. It's more like a partitioned version of SoftLayer.
- 0xdeadbeefbabe 9y agoThis is a tangent: I'm baffled by the subtext that the attackers have such an easy time attacking, and defenders have such a hard time defending that security experts are our only hope. It's really self serving, even if partly true. I don't know where the truth begins and the self serving ends though.
- peterwwillis 9y agoDevelopers are focused on developing, not securing. Attackers are focused on attacking, not developing. Defenders are focused on attackers and securing. It's not that security experts are our only hope, it's that you don't go to a mechanical engineer when your car breaks down. One person is really good at designing, and another person is really good at fixing. In the ideal case, the fixer brings the broken thing to the designer so the designer can improve the design. The tighter that loop is, the quicker the quality gets better.