3 ms·
man urandom > When read during early boot time, /dev/urandom may return data prior to the entropy pool being initialized. I see no bugs here. Just repeating w
by lihes 9y ago
man urandom
> When read during early boot time, /dev/urandom may return data prior to the entropy pool being initialized.
I see no bugs here. Just repeating what is written in the man page.
- anon1385 9y agoKeep in mind that a lot of high profile security people on HN and elsewhere have spent many years now telling everybody that the linux urandom man page is wrong, so don't be surprised when people ignore it. https://hn.algolia.com/?query=urandom%20manpage&sort=byPopularity&prefix&page=0&dateRange=all&type=comment https://hn.algolia.com/?query=urandom%20manpage&sort=byPopul...
- jwilk 9y agoPlease don't post shallow dismissals. None of the reported bugs are about /dev/urandom returning data too early.
- oconnor663 9y agoIf you continue to the next sentence in that man page: > If this is of concern in your application, use getrandom(2) or /dev/random instead. These bugs affect getrandom too.
- lihes 9y agoWhere is it written? Could you pin point it? I see urandom everywhere.
- oconnor663 9y agoI got it from this part, unless I'm misreading: > Multiple callers, including sys_getrandom(..., flags=0), attempt to wait for the > RNG to become cryptographically safe before reading from it by checking for > crng_ready() and waiting if necessary. However, crng_ready() only checks for > `crng_init > 0`, and `crng_init==1` does not imply that the RNG is > cryptographically safe.