3 ms·
From TFA: > == Discarded early randomness, including device randomness == > == RNG is treated as cryptographically safe too early == > == Interacti
by cryptonector 9y ago
From TFA:
> == Discarded early randomness, including device randomness ==
> == RNG is treated as cryptographically safe too early ==
> == Interaction between kernel and entropy-persisting userspace is broken ==
> == No entropy is fed into NUMA CRNGs between rand_initialize() initcall and crng_init==2 ==
> == initcall can propagate entropy into primary and NUMA CRNGs while crng_init==1 ==
and
> == Impact ==
> I have spent a few days attempting to figure out how bad these issues are.
> I believe that on an Intel Grass Canyon system, with RDRAND disabled,
> ASLR disabled, fast boot enabled, no connected devices, with boot on power,
> some frequency scaling options disabled, and the fan set to maximum,
> it should be possible to express the entropy in the used RDTSC samples in around
> 105 bits or less. (I'm not sure which parts of this configuration actually
> influence the amount of entropy; but ASLR certainly does influence it, since the
> one interrupt sample that is fed into the RNG before the RNG initialization
> contains an instruction pointer.)
- ploxiln 9y agoDue to some unfortunate complications of somewhat recent changes: > The worst part of this (one device entropy sample being enough to move to crng_init==1) was AFAICS introduced in commit ee7998c50c26 ("random: do not ignore early device randomness"), first in v4.14. confirmed by the fix for that bit: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/drivers/char/random.c?id=dc12baacb95f205948f64dc936a47d89ee110117 https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/lin...
- londons_explore 9y ago"105 bits" isn't too shabby. I'd only start to worry when it gets to say 70 bits or less. That's the kind of size a state actor could precompute ssh host keys for each of the initial random number states in a common distro for example. If a state actor could compute ssh keys in 50 milliseconds on custom hardware, and they had 100,000 machines generating those keys, they could generate enough keys to have a 1 in 1 million chance for 70 bits of entropy after 20 years.
- loeg 9y agoEmphasis on "or less." Anyway, far far below expected entropy.