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I think both science and logic (what the article calls Reason) are poor tools for studying complex systems--things like software and people. The guess-and-chec

by Dove 16y ago

I think both science and logic (what the article calls Reason) are poor tools for studying complex systems--things like software and people. The guess-and-check methodology of science works great when one is studying simple, consistent, statistically tractible behavior. Ask a scientist to characterize gravity, and he does a great job. But ask a scientist to characterize something complex--e.g., MS Word--something with a lot of inputs and outputs, complex behavior which changes in subtle ways in different circumstances--and he'll have a tough time with it. The reason is that the models of science converge inexorably and certainly, but slowly; too slowly to be really useful when studying complex things. The scientist may be able to characterize a few simple features of something complex, but it'll be a long time before he can totally describe the object's behavior. In the case of complex systems, my preferred epistemic tool is revelation. Read the source code. Ask the person what they're thinking. Peek under the hood. Ask the designer what he was trying to accomplish. Logic in particular serves an interesting purpose in complex systems. One usually thinks of logic as a tool to go from secure axioms to secure conclusions, but in the case of an unknown system, the axioms and models and definitions are what we're trying to discover. Hence, my primary use of logic when studying a complex system (e.g., while debugging software) is as a tool to highlight paradox. That is, to go from clearly-impossible conclusions to unstated false assumptions, or better definitions. Not, "The source code shows nothing changing the value of this variable, hence something else must be causing the bug," but "The source code shows nothing changing the value of this variable, yet the value does change, hence my assumptions about what can change a variable's value must be wrong." Of course, when one is studying something opaque and complex, such as a market or biological system, revelation is not available as a tool. But one should still retain respect for the limitations of science as a methodology in that situation, and respect the complexity of reality in contrast with the simplicity of science's results.

Dove 16y ago
While we're talking about unusual epistemic tools, emotion has a really bad reputation, but what people are criticizing is not emotion as a properly used tool, but its improper use. The improper, oft-criticized use of emotion is saying, "I feel X is true" or "I want X to be true", hence "I believe X." This is clearly unreliable. But consider the role emotion does properly play. "This is surprising," "Huh, that's funny," "I wonder why..." and "That can't be right." These positive and negative reactions to data are feelings. Curiosity, fascination, frustration at the impossible, the pain of unresolved paradox. Judging knowledge to be either trivia essentially interesting--final value judgements. These are emotions that push us to apply other epistemic tools to the right questions in the right ways. I once suffered a mental illness that made it difficult for me to feel certain emotions. One of the most fascinating results of the experience was the degree to which my ability to reason degraded. Unable to distinguish the interesting from the uninteresting, the fascinating from the trivial, unmotivated to pursue and resolve impossibilities, I was unable to undertake even simple logical tasks such as debugging. There is a popular notion that a disinterested party will provide the most accurate account of a phenomenon, the object being to avoid bias. I think this is only part of the story. True, an interested party fall pray to phenomena like confirmation bias. But a disinterested party will fall prey to analytical apathy, happy with slapdash, second-rate models and explanations. I believe the best work comes from a dialogue between people with diverse yet healthy emotional attachments to a problem and a commitment to intellectual honesty.
- ronin358 16y ago
  >I once suffered a mental illness that made it difficult for me to feel certain emotions. One of the most fascinating results of the experience was the degree to which my ability to reason degraded. This helps reinforce a thought I've been playing around with since my 20's. It seems quite ridiculous to me that reason is set in conflict with emotion (a remnant, I believe, of the historical conflict of science contra religion in the west). It is much more likely that the ability to reason is a subset of emotion, i.e., reasoning is nothing more than the development of particular emotions working in concert. This conception is more aligned with how evolution actually operates (building upon the processes of before) rather than having to explain a "magical" reason which just appears out of nowhere in the human mind and dominates the animal nature. Just a thought...I hope you were able to deal with your illness well.

by Dove 16y ago

Dove 16y ago

While we're talking about unusual epistemic tools, emotion has a really bad reputation, but what people are criticizing is not emotion as a properly used tool, but its improper use. The improper, oft-criticized use of emotion is saying, "I feel X is true" or "I want X to be true", hence "I believe X." This is clearly unreliable. But consider the role emotion does properly play. "This is surprising," "Huh, that's funny," "I wonder why..." and "That can't be right." These positive and negative reactions to data are feelings. Curiosity, fascination, frustration at the impossible, the pain of unresolved paradox. Judging knowledge to be either trivia essentially interesting--final value judgements. These are emotions that push us to apply other epistemic tools to the right questions in the right ways. I once suffered a mental illness that made it difficult for me to feel certain emotions. One of the most fascinating results of the experience was the degree to which my ability to reason degraded. Unable to distinguish the interesting from the uninteresting, the fascinating from the trivial, unmotivated to pursue and resolve impossibilities, I was unable to undertake even simple logical tasks such as debugging. There is a popular notion that a disinterested party will provide the most accurate account of a phenomenon, the object being to avoid bias. I think this is only part of the story. True, an interested party fall pray to phenomena like confirmation bias. But a disinterested party will fall prey to analytical apathy, happy with slapdash, second-rate models and explanations. I believe the best work comes from a dialogue between people with diverse yet healthy emotional attachments to a problem and a commitment to intellectual honesty.

ronin358 16y ago
>I once suffered a mental illness that made it difficult for me to feel certain emotions. One of the most fascinating results of the experience was the degree to which my ability to reason degraded. This helps reinforce a thought I've been playing around with since my 20's. It seems quite ridiculous to me that reason is set in conflict with emotion (a remnant, I believe, of the historical conflict of science contra religion in the west). It is much more likely that the ability to reason is a subset of emotion, i.e., reasoning is nothing more than the development of particular emotions working in concert. This conception is more aligned with how evolution actually operates (building upon the processes of before) rather than having to explain a "magical" reason which just appears out of nowhere in the human mind and dominates the animal nature. Just a thought...I hope you were able to deal with your illness well.