3 ms·
I've heard rumors of an even more insidious backdoor. Screwing with the dopants slightly in order to bias the HRNG slightly one way. Wouldn't show up even und
by monocasa 9y ago
I've heard rumors of an even more insidious backdoor.
Screwing with the dopants slightly in order to bias the HRNG slightly one way. Wouldn't show up even under a full visual inspection.
- cryptonector 9y agoYou can get around this. A biased HRNG is still an RNG, and there are other sources of entropy on a system anyways, so a decent OS can make exploiting a bias in an RNG infeasible.
- monocasa 9y agoDo the RNGs for fixed hardware devices like hardware security modules typically mix entropy from several sources?
- dfox 9y agoI assume that HSM as discrete hardware devices certainly use their hardware RNG only as one input to some /dev/random like CSPRNG. On the other hand I would also assume that single-chip "HSMs" (smartcards...) do not although I vaguely remember that for TPM (which is hardware-wise a smartcard with weird host interface) the RNG output is somehow dependent on state of attestation registers.
- cryptonector 9y agoSure, many HSMs/smartcards/tokens lack sophisticated RNGs. And NIST's SP800-90 has proven weak on this.
- dfox 9y agoI'm probably biased because I spend good part of quarter by designing reasonably secure CSPRNG for smartcard chip without hardware RNG (and ended up exploiting essentially any cross-clockdomain communication as entropy source) and thus I assume that typical smardcard vendors don't care about that (too much work) while HSM vendors simply leverage infrastructure of whatever (RT)OS they use and probably harden that somewhat.
- tripletao 9y agoDo you have a source for this? That sounds incredibly implausible--analog tolerances are basically never tight enough that you'd rely on them for something like the DC value of an RNG's output, over temperature, normal production spread, etc. Any hardware RNG at least goes through digital processing to remove that bias, and usually goes through a cryptographically strong PRNG. As an aside, hardware RNGs are one of the only places you can put an undetectable backdoor in a design, since they can't be verified (since they're deliberately non-deterministic). If you do hash(stuff) ^ HRNG, then the CPU can make the result whatever it wants. If you do hash(stuff ^ HRNG) then it can't.
- kwantam 9y agoSounds like Becker, Regazzoni, Paar, Burleson. "Stealthy dopant-level hardware trojans." Proceedings of CHES, August 2013. https://sharps.org/wp-content/uploads/BECKER-CHES.pdf https://sharps.org/wp-content/uploads/BECKER-CHES.pdf
- yborg 9y agoNever trust a chip you didn't fab yourself. This is seriously clever work. Bribe the right people at TSMC, and all of Apple's chips have a built-in side channel vector. Or any other fabless organization.
- fredley 9y agoThis might be a silly question, but even if you do fab it 'yourself', does that solve the problem? It might make it harder, but people can still be bribed, or have other pressures applied to them.
- anfilt 9y agoWould you put a back door in your own chip? I am not sure how bribe would work if your the target.
- AnimalMuppet 9y agoI suspect that you're thinking of bribing an organization. You're correct, it's hard to bribe an organization to act against its own interest. But instead, think about bribing one or two workers individuals within the organization. That's much more doable.