4 ms·

> but my default position is to assume the Windows partition is exploitable In reality, as the article explains, the windows partition is basically invulnerabl

> but my default position is to assume the Windows partition is exploitable In reality, as the article explains, the windows partition is basically invulnerable to this class of attacks if you take the 5 minutes to enable bitlocker. OTOH Linux systems have no effective defense.

Jedd 8y ago
That may or may not be the case. My primary concern - I should perhaps have spelled it out more clearly - is that the Windows partition is likely exploitable via Microsoft Windows. Detecting data at-rest exploits such as described in TFA, and per my mitigation suggestions -- because they don't scale well -- implies that you're already of interest to your adversary.
jjess 8y ago
BitLocker stores your encryption keys on a Microsoft server [1] and is a closed-source software, therefore by definition it cannot be trusted for encrypting anything important. (It is wrong even if your adversary is not a state, because that way you are getting used to a false sense of security that you don't actually have.) [1] https://theintercept.com/2015/12/28/recently-bought-a-windows-computer-microsoft-probably-has-your-encryption-key/ https://theintercept.com/2015/12/28/recently-bought-a-window...
- kazinator 8y ago
  "Stores keys on someone's server" cannot be trusted, no matter what the copyright status is of the code running on the server. Code licensing or copyright status isn't a form of security. The issue isn't just that the remote server's code is impervious to scrutiny. A locally installed program that you can reverse engineer isn't automatically trustworthy because it is open-source, or even copylefted. Someone actually has to reverse engineer the binary and prove that it matches the source code. Many users of free software trust upstream binaries. (Even if they compile their own programs, they trust compiler binaries at some point.)
- ams6110 8y ago
  It's an option to store your keys on their server, but not a requirement. At least not the last time I set up BitLocker. In fact that computer didn't even have the on board Secure Storage thing that it prefers, so I had to make a note of the recovery key on paper.

Jedd 8y ago

That may or may not be the case. My primary concern - I should perhaps have spelled it out more clearly - is that the Windows partition is likely exploitable via Microsoft Windows. Detecting data at-rest exploits such as described in TFA, and per my mitigation suggestions -- because they don't scale well -- implies that you're already of interest to your adversary.

jjess 8y ago

BitLocker stores your encryption keys on a Microsoft server [1] and is a closed-source software, therefore by definition it cannot be trusted for encrypting anything important. (It is wrong even if your adversary is not a state, because that way you are getting used to a false sense of security that you don't actually have.) [1] https://theintercept.com/2015/12/28/recently-bought-a-windows-computer-microsoft-probably-has-your-encryption-key/ https://theintercept.com/2015/12/28/recently-bought-a-window...

kazinator 8y ago
"Stores keys on someone's server" cannot be trusted, no matter what the copyright status is of the code running on the server. Code licensing or copyright status isn't a form of security. The issue isn't just that the remote server's code is impervious to scrutiny. A locally installed program that you can reverse engineer isn't automatically trustworthy because it is open-source, or even copylefted. Someone actually has to reverse engineer the binary and prove that it matches the source code. Many users of free software trust upstream binaries. (Even if they compile their own programs, they trust compiler binaries at some point.)
ams6110 8y ago
It's an option to store your keys on their server, but not a requirement. At least not the last time I set up BitLocker. In fact that computer didn't even have the on board Secure Storage thing that it prefers, so I had to make a note of the recovery key on paper.