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> Don't build circumvention tools. Could the entirety of your arguments against cryptosystem design not be applied to SSL in its infancy? Aren't the resources
by mindslight 16y ago
> Don't build circumvention tools.
Could the entirety of your arguments against cryptosystem design not be applied to SSL in its infancy? Aren't the resources of the attackers always larger than the resources of the developers?
There's clearly a large gap between what currently accepted protocols can do, and the capabilities of zero knowledge proofs and secure multiparty computation. It's certainly smart to reuse existing blocks rather than recreating their errors, but that doesn't mean all crypto protocol design work is antiquated.
(although please don't think I'm saying distributing Haystack to users in repressive regimes was anything but criminal malpractice. Even TOR says to not rely on it for strong anonymity)
- tptacek 16y agoIf SSL was being sold as a tool to allow people to visit censored Internet sites from ISPs controlled by a government that still kills people by burying them in a sand pit and hurling giant rocks at their head? Yes. It'd be the same argument. Since I never argued that all crypto protocol design work was "antiquated", I'm not sure how to respond to that. What I've said a bunch of times is: it is prohibitively difficult to get stealth circumvention tools right on the first try, and the adversary being circumvented could pay the couple million it would take to turn any such tool, without even noticing the cost.
- mindslight 16y agoThere's a big difference between saying that it's hard to get protocols/tools right on the first (or fifth) try, and stating that people should not develop 'circumvention' tools at all. (And I've seen you express that latter viewpoint more than once with respect to various experimental protocols)