Well, that's specifically my point - fundamentally the two attacks are the same. The key part here is the BGP leak itself. This specific attack would potentiall

Well, that's specifically my point - fundamentally the two attacks are the same. The key part here is the BGP leak itself. This specific attack would potentially be solved by DNSSEC, but if you can poison the internet routing table, you can just advertise a route for the IP you want to steal traffic from just as easily. The potential downside there is the specificity - last I checked, the internet routing table won't take anything more specific than a /24 - so if you can't provide a more specific route, as-path-length becomes the next determining factor, so you might be in a situation where you can announce the DNS cidr with more specificity and not whatever IP is in the A record... But that's pretty far outside of your control and could just as easily flip the other way. All of this is to say: I think the important part of this whole thing was the BGP hijack, and not necessarily the lower level specifics, because the hijack isn't dependent on a lot of those specifics.