Hart's argument is basically the same as Sheffner's argument, at least the part he quoted: I just have a hard time getting too worked up about what label we at

Hart's argument is basically the same as Sheffner's argument, at least the part he quoted: I just have a hard time getting too worked up about what label we attach to copyright. And I suspect most non-philosophers agree. Consider this thought experiment: Go to a studio head and say, "I've got a deal for you. I'll give you your copyright wish list: repeal first sale, make Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in Grokster the controlling opinion, delete Cablevision, Perfect 10 v. Amazon (and a few other Perfect 10 cases while we're at it) from the law books, and codify a "making available" right. But here's the catch: From now on, you are forever forbidden from referring to copyright as 'property,' and must instead call it a 'set of social relationships.'" Or go to a copyright skeptic, and say, "I've got a deal for you. I'll give you your copyright wish list: reduce the term of copyright back to 14 years, expand fair use, eliminate the derivative works right, and repeal the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA. But there's the catch: From now on, you must refer to copyright as property; no more of this 'set of social relationships' mumbo-jumbo." I'm confident both the studio head and the copyright skeptic would take those deals in a heartbeat. Ultimately, it's the substance, not the label, that matters. My question is: why the hell do you think the "studio head" and the "copyright skeptic" are arguing about terminology in the first place? The way I see it, Hart is basically saying "If you were offered to have things your way, but had to give up terminology, you would do it in a heartbeat, so why do you argue about terminology in the first place?" Which, to me, sounds naive. The reason people are arguing about legal definitions of terminology in the first place is because legal terms have certain definitions which govern how decisions are made in court.