2 ms·
So, you should not be surprised (but perhaps you are anyway) that how to work around not having DNSSEC on end systems is exactly what this work was about. Speci
by tialaramex 9y ago
So, you should not be surprised (but perhaps you are anyway) that how to work around not having DNSSEC on end systems is exactly what this work was about. Specifically, the idea is you shove DNSSEC RRs into TLS. Now the client doesn't need working DNSSEC, because the DNSSEC records were delivered with the connection. Hence the pinning question.
- raldi 9y agoThere's also https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4956 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4956 , which allows a domain to sign that a range of DNS entries does not exist; under this system, a client resolver could demand cryptographic proof that a domain was missing certain records, which stops the MitM RR-stripping attack.