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Well, I think that's what people are mostly concerned about. The current considerations regarding biometrics is that it ultimately results in an immutable means

by csydas 9y ago

Well, I think that's what people are mostly concerned about. The current considerations regarding biometrics is that it ultimately results in an immutable means of identification that cannot be revoked. With IRL identification (passports, driver's licenses, state issued IDs), these all have means of being revoked in some way with varying degrees of efficacy. Therein lies the issue with Biometric data being both username and password, for the most part. That most of the data is easily replicable aside, the fact is that you cannot control the cycle of your "credentials regeneration" since you're tied to the aging process. On top of that, the regeneration is even fairly predictable with current and past technology, and even non-technical solutions could accurately predict the physical changes in a person as they age. Biometric data is a matter of convenience, not really security. Combine with an additional password, it at least serves the role of a Username well. For low-value items, it can make sense, provided proper pre-cautions are taken for actually sensitive data. (e.g., unlocking your phone is fine provided that sensitive data is protected with additional precautions).

21 9y ago
Why couldn't we use a mechanism like certificate revocation? When you want to revoke you timestamped biometric package you just push it to some online revocation list.
- klez 9y ago
  Ok, but then what happens? You can never use you biometrics again?
  - 21 9y ago
    That's why I said timestamped. You would generate a new package, with the same biometrics, but with a timestamp after the revocation date of the previous package, just like today you can get a new passport with the same data as the old one.
curun1r 9y ago
I completely agree with some of what you said. But the point is that we should stop trying to make biometric security issues more accessible by making false equivalencies with well-understood authentication methods like username/password. It loses nuance and just causes problems. With a username, I can abandon the account and sign up for a new one with a new username. I can't do that with biometric auth. And unlike a username, it requires an advanced adversary to be able to fake it, so it's also unlike traditional usernames in that way. Unless, of course, you somehow have an unconscious principal, in which case biometric authentication can be significantly less secure than a username and password, which wouldn't be divulged by someone unresponsive. Biometric auth can also be much more secure under certain circumstances. When you combine it with, for example, a security guard that ensures that someone is using their own fingerprint/eye/face/etc, biometric authentication can make more sense than username and password. It's entirely situational which one works best. There's entirely too many people who think it's clever to notice differences between biometric authentication and passwords and to say that it's, instead, a username. And it's just flat wrong and needs to be called out. It's also flat out wrong for Apple to have equated it with a password in the first place, so that should also be called out. It's all identity and the security of identity validation is always situational. There are no universals and exploitable flaws hide the empty space when we try to put square pegs in round holes.

by csydas 9y ago

21 9y ago

Why couldn't we use a mechanism like certificate revocation? When you want to revoke you timestamped biometric package you just push it to some online revocation list.

klez 9y ago
Ok, but then what happens? You can never use you biometrics again?
- 21 9y ago
  That's why I said timestamped. You would generate a new package, with the same biometrics, but with a timestamp after the revocation date of the previous package, just like today you can get a new passport with the same data as the old one.

curun1r 9y ago

I completely agree with some of what you said. But the point is that we should stop trying to make biometric security issues more accessible by making false equivalencies with well-understood authentication methods like username/password. It loses nuance and just causes problems. With a username, I can abandon the account and sign up for a new one with a new username. I can't do that with biometric auth. And unlike a username, it requires an advanced adversary to be able to fake it, so it's also unlike traditional usernames in that way. Unless, of course, you somehow have an unconscious principal, in which case biometric authentication can be significantly less secure than a username and password, which wouldn't be divulged by someone unresponsive. Biometric auth can also be much more secure under certain circumstances. When you combine it with, for example, a security guard that ensures that someone is using their own fingerprint/eye/face/etc, biometric authentication can make more sense than username and password. It's entirely situational which one works best. There's entirely too many people who think it's clever to notice differences between biometric authentication and passwords and to say that it's, instead, a username. And it's just flat wrong and needs to be called out. It's also flat out wrong for Apple to have equated it with a password in the first place, so that should also be called out. It's all identity and the security of identity validation is always situational. There are no universals and exploitable flaws hide the empty space when we try to put square pegs in round holes.