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> With the push towards running all your apps in the browser for "sandboxing", the risk this poses keeps going up. Sandboxing cannot be relied upon a primary s
by pdkl95 9y ago
> With the push towards running all your apps in the browser for "sandboxing", the risk this poses keeps going up.
Sandboxing cannot be relied upon a primary security feature; at best it's only an additional roadblock that provides defense in depth. Isolating potentially malicious code in a sandbox is useless if you also run the the rest of your software in that same sandbox.
The browser sandbox was useful for isolating transient Javascript the current page/window. Your primary apps and always-running utilities were protected because they were outside the sandbox.
- kevingadd 9y agoYeah, precisely. I guess the core of my point is that we've moved many apps from running natively with user privs (with access to all the user's files, for good and for ill) to sandboxed websites - great! - meanwhile every chrome extension basically has admin privileges over those apps, and we're not really treating that with the caution we should.
- icebraining 9y agoYou can configure Chrome to run each site in a different sandbox: https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/site-isolation https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/site-isolati... The problem here isn't the shared sandbox, though, but that an adblocker needs access to every site to block their ads.