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Unless you can verify the deployed build against an open source code, whether the code is open source or not is irrelevant, you trust all the intermediaries. Wh
by cm2187 9y ago
Unless you can verify the deployed build against an open source code, whether the code is open source or not is irrelevant, you trust all the intermediaries. Which is ok for a corporate actor but probably not when you are a sovereign actor and know you are dealing with a keen NSA. How could you control that Apple or Google wouldn’t patch the app before it gets deployed or after it has been deployed?
- netsharc 9y agoA known Ken Thompson speech: https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=358210 https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=358210 (has a link to the full text as PDF). 4 paragraph summary: http://www.catb.org/jargon/html/B/back-door.html http://www.catb.org/jargon/html/B/back-door.html
- Arathorn 9y agoI imagine you’d run your own OS with reproduceable builds all the way down.
- cm2187 9y agoAll the way down to the hardware manufactured in China. Life sucks for paranoid intelligence services.
- Aissen 9y agoOn Android (at least); you can verify that the apk is signed with the developer's key; and Signal provides reproducible builds. Then the app is designed to not trust the server. I think we are in agreement that Apple or Google could patch the app before it gets deployed. But AFAIK it has never been done yet, and if it ever happens, it would undermine all credibility of the platform. Of course a state actor wouldn't want to be the first to find out.