> My earlier point was that a shared clock between processes amplifies this problem so that timing attacks cross even the process protection boundary. So when y

> My earlier point was that a shared clock between processes amplifies this problem so that timing attacks cross even the process protection boundary. So when you started talking about job scheduling, I assumed the following It doesn't, though. Your point fundamentally misunderstands the nature of a timing attack for ex-filtration. It doesn't cross process boundaries. It doesn't use any process crossing state of any kind for timing. It simply times how long it takes to access cache lines, which is perfectly local & isolated. It does not involve time correletation or association across processes of any kind. It doesn't care about real time at all. All it needs is a stopwatch that can measure the difference between 0.5-2ns & 80-120ns. The meltdown attack via SharedArrayBuffer did not use any untrusted code in the same process. It read kernel memory at will using 2 threads and an atomic int.