4 ms·
isn't a realistic attack in his threat model Under different circumstances your solution would be 100% correct, however, in this situation we are worried about
by woodall 16y ago
isn't a realistic attack in his threat model
Under different circumstances your solution would be 100% correct, however, in this situation we are worried about "everyday" type criminals. These are the guys/girls that find a laptop in an unlocked locker and snatch it; small window of opportunity. In your analogy the description of the criminals is much more sophisticated; Oceans 11 types.
Stealing RAM can potentially tip someone off to a threat, a better solution IMO is the Stone-Cold Bootkit[1]. The bootkit can hook into Windows in order to gain unrestricted access. It does this by writing to the MBR unrestricted; haven't we seen this before[2]? Once installed it will log your decryption password and do what ever with it.
A BIOS password(windows) and HHD encryption will be enough to keep the NSA out for a while, and a normal criminal out indefinitely.
It would be nice to have a mobo with some type of secure memory encryption programs could write to- digitally signed. Of course that could be owned too, but it's a start. In the words of Bruce Schneier, "[sic] it is very difficult to secure data when the attacker has physical control of the machine the data is stored on."[3]
Now I am thinking about the /boot partition in linux; where GRUB is stored.
[1] http://www.stoned-vienna.com/ http://www.stoned-vienna.com/
[2] http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1643451 http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1643451
[3] http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/02/cold_boot_attac.html http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/02/cold_boot_atta...
[4] PSA: http://zedomax.com/blog/2009/02/23/linux-boot-hack-how-to-password-protect-grub/ http://zedomax.com/blog/2009/02/23/linux-boot-hack-how-to-pa...
- tptacek 16y agoYou've cited Schneier citing the same Felton paper that 'all cited. This research, while interesting, does not mean what 'all think it means. It is simply not the case that an attacker who captures your powered-down machine is going to be able to use remanence attacks to recover your encryption key. The real-world attack Felton's paper implicates is this: an attacker captures your powered-on laptop, because you left it sleeping in your bag and your full-disk encryption software can't reliably wipe keys when it wakes from sleep. The attacker restarts the system and uses remanence to dd the previous RAM contents into a drive for analysis. This very well may be an attack that government agencies are prepared to use against laptops, but since it's not going to work against anyone who knows how full-disk encryption works, it's simply not going to be in the arsenal of someone who steals your bag out of a bar.