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The difference between can and do I have never worked in a company that physically segregated their internal network to one connected to the internet - and I h

by rakkhi 16y ago

The difference between can and do I have never worked in a company that physically segregated their internal network to one connected to the internet - and I have worked in Fortune 50 banks, credit card processors and online businesses. Like I said military maybe different but I know colleagues that work for the government and you should hear about how their security actually is vs. the perception (much like banks) It is hard enough to get companies to segment their network into high value services vs the office network. The practical difficulty and cost of giving end users two machines connected to two different networks is just not worth the benefit gained. Especially considering you can achieve a level of risk that is acceptable to the board and executive management with logical controls private clouds are just a waste of money.

bmelton 16y ago
Federal government is almost certainly what he's talking about. We have heavily guarded rooms with impressive physical security, and authorized personnel only, in which the two networks can be 'viewed' at the same time. For what it's worth, the majority of end users don't have two machines, they either visit a secured location when they need to, or have devices / software that only allow them to connect to one network OR the other at a time. Generally speaking though, the network that has access to tactical data, or knows the most recent whereabouts of Saddam Hussein is typically ignorant of Facebook, or the internet at large.
- rakkhi 16y ago
  ok fine I have seen these type of examples but where is the weakest link - e.g. does this super secret segregated network backup to unencrypted tape which is then lost or stolen (http://bit.ly/cQZiRd http://bit.ly/cQZiRd) a hard drive stolen (http://bit.ly/aLH2xI http://bit.ly/aLH2xI), a legitimate user walks out with info (http://bit.ly/b8Iecp http://bit.ly/b8Iecp), a laptop stolen (http://bit.ly/cp0h5Q http://bit.ly/cp0h5Q) The point I'm trying to make is you have to look at security holisticly. Having a super strong segregated network has no point if you are not going to have a similar level of control everywhere else which I can guarantee you the Federal government especially in the US does not have. So why not take advantage of the cloud, enjoy the cost decrease, increase in resilience and scalability and still have an acceptable level of risk with application of reasonable logical controls?
  - bmelton 16y ago
    I think we're deviating away from the real topic at hand, but regardless, I couldn't say specifically what the weakest link is... while I know that the tapes themselves have their own procedures, I don't know what they are. The 'legitimate users' issue is largely mitigated from malice by severely limiting who those users are with background checks, security clearances, layered access levels, and a culture in which everybody reinforces the security procedures and watches for others who might be violating them, intentionally or unintentionally. This isn't 100% of course, nothing is, but it's largely effective I would guess. Stolen laptops of course happen on occasion, but it's a dramatically different problem than unintentional access to a data center, or all the data therein. Further, most of the laptops I've seen have data-at-rest encryption, remote locating devices (GPS) and fairly stringent security protections on the device. In order to connect to any sensitive networks, they'd also have to use VPN and 2 factor encryption. Largely, these things have already been thought of... but more importantly, if you're statement holds weight, and they should have stringent controls everywhere to be effective, then why would they arbitrarily allow their data to be potentially compromised in the event that Amazon has less stringent requirements -- and guess what, they do.
    - eitally 16y ago
      You've done a good job answering the question asked of me -- thank you. To add a little more, in places where security really matters, like DoD manufacturing areas, there is literally physical security segregating everything from the people to the network to the hardware to the data from the unclassified parts. Knowing you could go to jail for a very long time if you do something stupid or illegal is a strong motivator. For those not so motivated, most places not only segregate the network but also the data: tapes or backup data are kept onsite in a secure area, computers used for interacting with the data never leave the secure area and have been modified not to have USB headers or removable hard drives, cables and gear are physically protected from tampering, etc. None of this is to say that all risk is eliminated, but since most systems are compromised by casual hackers using simple tools, adding the security you can is usually a sensible thing to do.
      - 16y ago

by rakkhi 16y ago

bmelton 16y ago

Federal government is almost certainly what he's talking about. We have heavily guarded rooms with impressive physical security, and authorized personnel only, in which the two networks can be 'viewed' at the same time. For what it's worth, the majority of end users don't have two machines, they either visit a secured location when they need to, or have devices / software that only allow them to connect to one network OR the other at a time. Generally speaking though, the network that has access to tactical data, or knows the most recent whereabouts of Saddam Hussein is typically ignorant of Facebook, or the internet at large.

rakkhi 16y ago
ok fine I have seen these type of examples but where is the weakest link - e.g. does this super secret segregated network backup to unencrypted tape which is then lost or stolen (http://bit.ly/cQZiRd http://bit.ly/cQZiRd) a hard drive stolen (http://bit.ly/aLH2xI http://bit.ly/aLH2xI), a legitimate user walks out with info (http://bit.ly/b8Iecp http://bit.ly/b8Iecp), a laptop stolen (http://bit.ly/cp0h5Q http://bit.ly/cp0h5Q) The point I'm trying to make is you have to look at security holisticly. Having a super strong segregated network has no point if you are not going to have a similar level of control everywhere else which I can guarantee you the Federal government especially in the US does not have. So why not take advantage of the cloud, enjoy the cost decrease, increase in resilience and scalability and still have an acceptable level of risk with application of reasonable logical controls?
- bmelton 16y ago
  I think we're deviating away from the real topic at hand, but regardless, I couldn't say specifically what the weakest link is... while I know that the tapes themselves have their own procedures, I don't know what they are. The 'legitimate users' issue is largely mitigated from malice by severely limiting who those users are with background checks, security clearances, layered access levels, and a culture in which everybody reinforces the security procedures and watches for others who might be violating them, intentionally or unintentionally. This isn't 100% of course, nothing is, but it's largely effective I would guess. Stolen laptops of course happen on occasion, but it's a dramatically different problem than unintentional access to a data center, or all the data therein. Further, most of the laptops I've seen have data-at-rest encryption, remote locating devices (GPS) and fairly stringent security protections on the device. In order to connect to any sensitive networks, they'd also have to use VPN and 2 factor encryption. Largely, these things have already been thought of... but more importantly, if you're statement holds weight, and they should have stringent controls everywhere to be effective, then why would they arbitrarily allow their data to be potentially compromised in the event that Amazon has less stringent requirements -- and guess what, they do.
  - eitally 16y ago
    You've done a good job answering the question asked of me -- thank you. To add a little more, in places where security really matters, like DoD manufacturing areas, there is literally physical security segregating everything from the people to the network to the hardware to the data from the unclassified parts. Knowing you could go to jail for a very long time if you do something stupid or illegal is a strong motivator. For those not so motivated, most places not only segregate the network but also the data: tapes or backup data are kept onsite in a secure area, computers used for interacting with the data never leave the secure area and have been modified not to have USB headers or removable hard drives, cables and gear are physically protected from tampering, etc. None of this is to say that all risk is eliminated, but since most systems are compromised by casual hackers using simple tools, adding the security you can is usually a sensible thing to do.
    - 16y ago