> boot volume encryption is relatively unimportant for the threat model you propose, specifically untargeted data at rest. I'll have to respectfully disagree h

> boot volume encryption is relatively unimportant for the threat model you propose, specifically untargeted data at rest. I'll have to respectfully disagree here. Windows has heaps of different ways of caching all kinds of information outside of your home folder. Individual applications can also cache stuff wherever permissions allow (and often do). Realistically with Windows if you're going to encrypt you want to encrypt your C: drive. PGP WDE works, it's 'good enough' to be a PITA for any authorities and you can use the same software on PC and Mac, but be warned - PGP broke Snow Leopard upgrades from Leopard when it came out and every major PGP upgrade I've ever done on Windows has resulted in a reinstall (but then again, 9.x was really, really bad). If you're using a non-administrator account for your day to day on OSX you can use FileVault - just watch your /tmp folder.