5 ms·

Why hasn't Telegram implemented domain fronting? Did they really have so much hubris that they thought this would never happen?

by bjoli 9y ago

y_molodtsov 9y ago
Apple and Google will likely comply and delete the app in their Russian stores in any case.
- deleted 9y ago
  [deleted]
SXX 9y ago
They would just blacklist IPs or whole subnets. How would domain fronting help exactly if even US cloud providers surrender under Russian government threats? Other service called Zello avoided blocks by changing IP addresses on AWS until Russian government gave command to block 13,5M of Amazon IPs [1]. On next day Amazon simply forbid them to change IPs. [1] https://torrentfreak.com/russia-asked-isps-to-block-13-5-million-amazon-ip-addresses-to-silence-one-app-180331/ https://torrentfreak.com/russia-asked-isps-to-block-13-5-mil...
- zzzcpan 9y ago
  The idea behind domain fronting is to make blacklisting unfeasible. It's kind of like Zello changing IP addresses, except you also happen to share those IP addresses with a lot of popular internet services. So, in order to block domain fronting the government would have to pressure a whole bunch of large foreign corporations with CDNs to patch their tech to forbid domain fronting.
  - SXX 9y ago
    No, they wouldn't need to pressure anyone. They'll just ban whole subnets of CDNs that are not used by any services popular in Russia. And cloud providers and CDNs that have large customers from Russia will just give up like Amazon just did. After all it's just a business for them and they not going to lose clients just to fight against censorship.
tptacek 9y ago
Telegram hasn't even implemented proper end-to-end encryption; they still actively advertise client-to-server encryption as a privacy feature. Domain fronting is 10 years more advanced than their technology. Did you know they can't E2E encrypt group conversations? A lot of people seem not to know that.
- zzzcpan 9y ago
  As you can see having end-to-end or client-to-server encryption is irrelevant to Russia. They suggested to implement a backdoor either way. Which they absolutely can suggest to Whatsapp and Signal, since they are both centralized too. As I said before, end-to-end encryption in a centralized app is a joke and is absolutely irrelevant for its threat model. But, whatever, security is a very dirty industry.
  - tptacek 9y ago
    This is word salad. The point of end-to-end encryption is to provide confidentiality to endpoints even when there's an untrusted relay; that's what the "end" in E2E is.
    - zzzcpan 9y ago
      And your point is? Let's go though this again. You still have to trust someone to implement E2E encryption, guarantee said confidentiality and guarantee to keep it with each update pf the app they provide, etc. It's absolutely the same as trusting them to just not spy on you on their servers with client-to-server encryption. And if they are forced to implement a backdoor, it doesn't matter whether they do it on their servers or push an update to a supposedly secure app.
      - magic_quotes 9y ago
        > trusting them to just not spy on you on their servers with client-to-server encryption. Everyone would eventually spy on you on their server. Either by voluntary choice or being forced by some government entity. In this day and age it doesn't even make sense to discuss any hypothetical situations where they are not collecting (all of) your data. > And if they are forced to implement a backdoor, it doesn't matter whether they do it on their servers or push an update to a supposedly secure app. One of this things is not like the other. Remember, Signal-style e2e encryption isn't concerned with individual safety that much, it's main aim is the governmental mass surveillance. Server side data collection is, obviously, completely transparent for the end user. Client side backdoor would be quite inconvenient on that scale: the more it's used, the higher would be the chance of discovery. Thus, presumably, it would be used less frivolously.

Why hasn't Telegram implemented domain fronting? Did they really have so much hubris that they thought this would never happen?

by bjoli 9y ago

Why hasn't Telegram implemented domain fronting? Did they really have so much hubris that they thought this would never happen?

y_molodtsov 9y ago

Apple and Google will likely comply and delete the app in their Russian stores in any case.

deleted 9y ago
[deleted]

SXX 9y ago

They would just blacklist IPs or whole subnets. How would domain fronting help exactly if even US cloud providers surrender under Russian government threats? Other service called Zello avoided blocks by changing IP addresses on AWS until Russian government gave command to block 13,5M of Amazon IPs [1]. On next day Amazon simply forbid them to change IPs. [1] https://torrentfreak.com/russia-asked-isps-to-block-13-5-million-amazon-ip-addresses-to-silence-one-app-180331/ https://torrentfreak.com/russia-asked-isps-to-block-13-5-mil...

zzzcpan 9y ago
The idea behind domain fronting is to make blacklisting unfeasible. It's kind of like Zello changing IP addresses, except you also happen to share those IP addresses with a lot of popular internet services. So, in order to block domain fronting the government would have to pressure a whole bunch of large foreign corporations with CDNs to patch their tech to forbid domain fronting.
- SXX 9y ago
  No, they wouldn't need to pressure anyone. They'll just ban whole subnets of CDNs that are not used by any services popular in Russia. And cloud providers and CDNs that have large customers from Russia will just give up like Amazon just did. After all it's just a business for them and they not going to lose clients just to fight against censorship.

tptacek 9y ago

Telegram hasn't even implemented proper end-to-end encryption; they still actively advertise client-to-server encryption as a privacy feature. Domain fronting is 10 years more advanced than their technology. Did you know they can't E2E encrypt group conversations? A lot of people seem not to know that.

zzzcpan 9y ago
As you can see having end-to-end or client-to-server encryption is irrelevant to Russia. They suggested to implement a backdoor either way. Which they absolutely can suggest to Whatsapp and Signal, since they are both centralized too. As I said before, end-to-end encryption in a centralized app is a joke and is absolutely irrelevant for its threat model. But, whatever, security is a very dirty industry.
- tptacek 9y ago
  This is word salad. The point of end-to-end encryption is to provide confidentiality to endpoints even when there's an untrusted relay; that's what the "end" in E2E is.
  - zzzcpan 9y ago
    And your point is? Let's go though this again. You still have to trust someone to implement E2E encryption, guarantee said confidentiality and guarantee to keep it with each update pf the app they provide, etc. It's absolutely the same as trusting them to just not spy on you on their servers with client-to-server encryption. And if they are forced to implement a backdoor, it doesn't matter whether they do it on their servers or push an update to a supposedly secure app.
    - magic_quotes 9y ago
      > trusting them to just not spy on you on their servers with client-to-server encryption. Everyone would eventually spy on you on their server. Either by voluntary choice or being forced by some government entity. In this day and age it doesn't even make sense to discuss any hypothetical situations where they are not collecting (all of) your data. > And if they are forced to implement a backdoor, it doesn't matter whether they do it on their servers or push an update to a supposedly secure app. One of this things is not like the other. Remember, Signal-style e2e encryption isn't concerned with individual safety that much, it's main aim is the governmental mass surveillance. Server side data collection is, obviously, completely transparent for the end user. Client side backdoor would be quite inconvenient on that scale: the more it's used, the higher would be the chance of discovery. Thus, presumably, it would be used less frivolously.