4 ms·
In general, I agree. However, as a mild counterpoint, I present Dual_EC_DRBG, where the NSA inserted a private kleptographic backdoor into the standard via the
by chaboud 9y ago
In general, I agree. However, as a mild counterpoint, I present Dual_EC_DRBG, where the NSA inserted a private kleptographic backdoor into the standard via the conveniently provided P and Q points.
Brilliantly awful.
You realize, of course, that, of your two choices, the DOJ would probably choose the former (i.e. general insecurity).
- Retric 9y agoDual_EC_DRBG was demonstrated not to be secure, so it does not support your point. Again, any government backdoor = security failure and there is no way around this.
- hackinthebochs 9y agoHow was it demonstrated not to be secure?
- chaboud 9y agoFirst off, I agree that, in principle, a backdoor is a backdoor, and vulnerable is vulnerable, period. However, there's A5/3 weak, where everyone can hack it, and there's Dual_EC_DRBG, where the right secret is necessary. What was interesting about Dual_EC_DRBG was that the default points served as sort of a secret master key to generator state leakage. It was harder than usual for another party to gain illicit access, leaving the vulnerability largely in the hands of the NSA. It was some pretty interesting math, harder for unintended (by the NSA) people to take advantage of, and still, of course, a crippling vulnerability. At this point, I'd be hard pressed to trust the NSA with anything security related, as they have demonstrated different priorities.
- Ar-Curunir 9y agoDUAL_EC is also a bad example, as demonstrated by the Juniper ScreenOS incident