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You can't have it both ways. Pick one: 1. Insecure systems: government can get in, but so can hackers. 2. Secure systems: hackers can't get in, but neither c

You can't have it both ways. Pick one: 1. Insecure systems: government can get in, but so can hackers. 2. Secure systems: hackers can't get in, but neither can government. It's a binary choice. Like being pregnant. You are, or you are not. There is no try.

nathan_long 9y ago
Yes. More specifically, encrypted data cannot be decrypted without the key. So your choices are: 1. Only the user has their key 2. Someone else has the user's key If a company, law enforcement, or anybody else has a trove of everyone's keys, that trove will be extremely valuable to hackers, organized crime, domestic and foreign intelligence, etc, and it will be stolen. Whether we'll know it's been stolen is another question.
- niftich 9y ago
  The debate typically continues along the government's right to compel the holder to reveal the key, or to reveal the decrypted message, as a loose analogue of rights of governments, where exists, to compel physical writings or access to a strongbox. If we accept that mechanisms in common use, like warrantful search of physical belongings under the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution, are legitimate and rightful functions of government, then warrantful key disclosure is a logical compromise that protects the individual's privacy, except when the government compels them with good cause to reveal information. Balancing this with protections against self-incrimination is one complication that's currently playing out.
  - pjc50 9y ago
    My proposal for this, which I doubt either side would support, I call the "piggybank protocol". It has four key elements: - hardware key storage, iphone/TPM style - mechanism for the manufacturer to authorise key release from a device - important 1: this process should be irreversibly tamper-evident, such as IC "fuses" or one-time PROM. This should be permanently visible in the UI, so it cannot be applied invisibly. - important 2: an obligation on the state to pay for replacement devices which have been compromised in the previous step but not used in court. This is to prevent it being routineised.
    - cesarb 9y ago
      How would tamper evidence help if the device is stolen? If nobody but me has the device encryption key, and my device is stolen, I can be sure that nobody will have access to whatever data it contains. If anybody else has the device encryption key, however, and the device is stolen, I can no longer know whether anybody else had access to the data, no matter how much tamper evidence the device has.
  - nv-vn 9y ago
    This may be nitpicky, but I don't think we should use the phrase "rights of the government." It implies that the government has some innate justification for those actions, and I think it leads to a slippery slope whereby we create rights of the collective. For example, if the government has the right to jail people, the jail is there to protect all of us. As a society, that gives us the right to beg for anyone to be thrown into jail "for the good of society." It also gives legitimacy to any government action: if they have a right to throw people in jail, you can't really complain about it when they do so even if they're clearly in the wrong.
chaboud 9y ago
In general, I agree. However, as a mild counterpoint, I present Dual_EC_DRBG, where the NSA inserted a private kleptographic backdoor into the standard via the conveniently provided P and Q points. Brilliantly awful. You realize, of course, that, of your two choices, the DOJ would probably choose the former (i.e. general insecurity).
- Retric 9y ago
  Dual_EC_DRBG was demonstrated not to be secure, so it does not support your point. Again, any government backdoor = security failure and there is no way around this.
  - hackinthebochs 9y ago
    How was it demonstrated not to be secure?
  - chaboud 9y ago
    First off, I agree that, in principle, a backdoor is a backdoor, and vulnerable is vulnerable, period. However, there's A5/3 weak, where everyone can hack it, and there's Dual_EC_DRBG, where the right secret is necessary. What was interesting about Dual_EC_DRBG was that the default points served as sort of a secret master key to generator state leakage. It was harder than usual for another party to gain illicit access, leaving the vulnerability largely in the hands of the NSA. It was some pretty interesting math, harder for unintended (by the NSA) people to take advantage of, and still, of course, a crippling vulnerability. At this point, I'd be hard pressed to trust the NSA with anything security related, as they have demonstrated different priorities.
- Ar-Curunir 9y ago
  DUAL_EC is also a bad example, as demonstrated by the Juniper ScreenOS incident
vbezhenar 9y ago
That's wrong. Encrypt all necessary data with government-controlled public key. Government can get in, but hackers can't.
- webbles 9y ago
  In a sentence, you have shown that you don't understand asymmetric encryption.
- sitharus 9y ago
  That’s an insecure system. All Eve needs to do is get hold of that third-party key. It’s like requiring all homes to be master keyed with a key held by the police - you need to find an officer willing to take a photo of the key for a few thousand dollars and now you can get in to any house.
- manjushri 9y ago
  That's wrong. Insiders can leak the private key, or hackers can take it.
  - gldalmaso 9y ago
    Or the government can leave it behind their remote servers along with their cyber weapons for anyone to wander by.
    - LolWolf 9y ago
      Or anyone who is willing to spend enough computational power now only needs to crack one key instead of millions of different ones.
      - vbezhenar 9y ago
        If there's anyone who can have enough computation power to break key, then that key is weak and its size should be increased.
someguydave 9y ago
Yes, and it appears that our government has chosen #1 for us.

nathan_long 9y ago

Yes. More specifically, encrypted data cannot be decrypted without the key. So your choices are: 1. Only the user has their key 2. Someone else has the user's key If a company, law enforcement, or anybody else has a trove of everyone's keys, that trove will be extremely valuable to hackers, organized crime, domestic and foreign intelligence, etc, and it will be stolen. Whether we'll know it's been stolen is another question.

niftich 9y ago
The debate typically continues along the government's right to compel the holder to reveal the key, or to reveal the decrypted message, as a loose analogue of rights of governments, where exists, to compel physical writings or access to a strongbox. If we accept that mechanisms in common use, like warrantful search of physical belongings under the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution, are legitimate and rightful functions of government, then warrantful key disclosure is a logical compromise that protects the individual's privacy, except when the government compels them with good cause to reveal information. Balancing this with protections against self-incrimination is one complication that's currently playing out.
- pjc50 9y ago
  My proposal for this, which I doubt either side would support, I call the "piggybank protocol". It has four key elements: - hardware key storage, iphone/TPM style - mechanism for the manufacturer to authorise key release from a device - important 1: this process should be irreversibly tamper-evident, such as IC "fuses" or one-time PROM. This should be permanently visible in the UI, so it cannot be applied invisibly. - important 2: an obligation on the state to pay for replacement devices which have been compromised in the previous step but not used in court. This is to prevent it being routineised.
  - cesarb 9y ago
    How would tamper evidence help if the device is stolen? If nobody but me has the device encryption key, and my device is stolen, I can be sure that nobody will have access to whatever data it contains. If anybody else has the device encryption key, however, and the device is stolen, I can no longer know whether anybody else had access to the data, no matter how much tamper evidence the device has.
- nv-vn 9y ago
  This may be nitpicky, but I don't think we should use the phrase "rights of the government." It implies that the government has some innate justification for those actions, and I think it leads to a slippery slope whereby we create rights of the collective. For example, if the government has the right to jail people, the jail is there to protect all of us. As a society, that gives us the right to beg for anyone to be thrown into jail "for the good of society." It also gives legitimacy to any government action: if they have a right to throw people in jail, you can't really complain about it when they do so even if they're clearly in the wrong.

chaboud 9y ago

In general, I agree. However, as a mild counterpoint, I present Dual_EC_DRBG, where the NSA inserted a private kleptographic backdoor into the standard via the conveniently provided P and Q points. Brilliantly awful. You realize, of course, that, of your two choices, the DOJ would probably choose the former (i.e. general insecurity).

Retric 9y ago
Dual_EC_DRBG was demonstrated not to be secure, so it does not support your point. Again, any government backdoor = security failure and there is no way around this.
- hackinthebochs 9y ago
  How was it demonstrated not to be secure?
- chaboud 9y ago
  First off, I agree that, in principle, a backdoor is a backdoor, and vulnerable is vulnerable, period. However, there's A5/3 weak, where everyone can hack it, and there's Dual_EC_DRBG, where the right secret is necessary. What was interesting about Dual_EC_DRBG was that the default points served as sort of a secret master key to generator state leakage. It was harder than usual for another party to gain illicit access, leaving the vulnerability largely in the hands of the NSA. It was some pretty interesting math, harder for unintended (by the NSA) people to take advantage of, and still, of course, a crippling vulnerability. At this point, I'd be hard pressed to trust the NSA with anything security related, as they have demonstrated different priorities.
Ar-Curunir 9y ago
DUAL_EC is also a bad example, as demonstrated by the Juniper ScreenOS incident

vbezhenar 9y ago

That's wrong. Encrypt all necessary data with government-controlled public key. Government can get in, but hackers can't.

webbles 9y ago
In a sentence, you have shown that you don't understand asymmetric encryption.
sitharus 9y ago
That’s an insecure system. All Eve needs to do is get hold of that third-party key. It’s like requiring all homes to be master keyed with a key held by the police - you need to find an officer willing to take a photo of the key for a few thousand dollars and now you can get in to any house.
manjushri 9y ago
That's wrong. Insiders can leak the private key, or hackers can take it.
- gldalmaso 9y ago
  Or the government can leave it behind their remote servers along with their cyber weapons for anyone to wander by.
  - LolWolf 9y ago
    Or anyone who is willing to spend enough computational power now only needs to crack one key instead of millions of different ones.
    - vbezhenar 9y ago
      If there's anyone who can have enough computation power to break key, then that key is weak and its size should be increased.

someguydave 9y ago

Yes, and it appears that our government has chosen #1 for us.