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Of course, this cable cut has nothing to do with this: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russian-submarines-are-prowling-around-vital-undersea-cables
by philprx 9y ago
Of course, this cable cut has nothing to do with this:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russian-submarines-are-prowling-around-vital-undersea-cables-its-making-nato-nervous/2017/12/22/d4c1f3da-e5d0-11e7-927a-e72eac1e73b6_story.html https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russian-submarin...
- walrus01 9y agoit is usually fishing trawlers and anchors. not saying that russia and the usa don't have submarines with the capability to do so, but that everyone knows deep ocean submarine cables are vulnerable, and nobody wants to open up their own vulnerable infrastructure to retaliation.
- philprx 9y agohmmm... https://siliconangle.com/blog/2013/07/19/how-the-nsa-taps-undersea-fiber-optic-cables/ https://siliconangle.com/blog/2013/07/19/how-the-nsa-taps-un...
- walrus01 9y agoI admin some long distance DWDM systems... Cutting a cable and inserting a MEMS optical switch into a path would introduce a noticeable degradation in signal level on the Rx end. Not saying it isn't possible, or that they can't make it look like minor cable damage from being hit by an anchor. The far more likely scenario is that the NSA has per-circuit taps at major cable landing stations (New Jersey/New York area, in Cornwall, etc). The GCHQ has a huge facility very close to where a number of submarine cables land in Cornwall. Trying to tap and store the data from every wavelength in a 80-channel DWDM system is like drinking from a firehose of data.
- philprx 9y agoAgreed on the difficulty: you would aim first at the low hanging fruit for placing the taps, the easiest being the onshoring spots. But... for the MEMS, I consider this as one way only (public, probably crude/basic) and very possibly we'll learn of other techniques that are usable in say, 5, 10 or 20 years. That's what our taxes are financing in the end ;-) research on fundamental new ways to tap the neighbour/hostile country's fiber. Lastly, I wouldn't sweat it too much on data/speed capacity but more on power needed to process and Y-split this datafeed to exfil. If in the future we got to learn that micro/nano-nuclear powerstations were tied to submarine interception points, I wouldn't be surprised at all. The data/speed capacity is probably the less difficult part compared to seamless insertion, power and exfil system. Now all these are just guesses based on what's public so far thanks to Snowden & al.
- walrus01 9y agothe glimmerglass MEMS product is not really intended for tapping anything. it's a good example of non classified technology. in real world use by telecoms and ISPs it's used as a light-path crossconnect builder for 1 to 1 paths between arbitrary fibers in a meet-me room... something like a labor/time saver for automated testing and lab setups, or to remove the labor and time involved in running a 15 meter two strand fiber crossconnect across a room between two fiber patch panels. If I recall correctly there's four or five companies that make very similar motorized-mirror optical crossconnect boxes similar to it.
- avs733 9y agoThat seem unlikely...it is pretty widely known/suspected/confirmed that the US at minimum has developed the capacity to hot tap fiber optic without disrupting signal to them. I would imagine Russia has similar capability. If it is a mistake during a tap, someone fucked up and they will get caught. More likely though was some form accident or trawler drag.
- MertsA 9y agoThis is what I just don't understand. Why isn't it commonplace to use MACsec on all long haul fiber? Compared to the cost of the cable itself the added cost of encrypting that traffic is barely enough to register as a rounding error. The fact that tapping into fiber is possible is a shame as there's plenty of commercially available hardware that would make that a practical impossibility.