3 ms·
How do you efficiently distribute benefits if you cannot ascertain if the individual is a Citizen, hasn't already taken his/her fair share or isn't scamming the
by shripadk 9y ago
How do you efficiently distribute benefits if you cannot ascertain if the individual is a Citizen, hasn't already taken his/her fair share or isn't scamming the exchequer?
You may disagree with the idea but in a country which has a very small tax base and caters to a huge population efficiently distributing benefits becomes the most important priority. Up until Aadhaar, the benefits meant for illiterate/lower income group were swindled by scamsters who used their identities to procure the benefits.
There was no way to ascertain if the individual was really below poverty line and that s/he hadn't taken more than his/her fair share of the benefits using a stolen identity. We can always debate issues of privacy endlessly but arrive at no conclusion which can actually solve the core issues. The core issue being that for the poorest of the poor, privacy is secondary to survival.
For some added perspective, here is a famous quote by Ex-Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi in 1985 (on a visit to drought-affected Kalahandi district, Odisha): "Of every rupee spent by the government, only 15 paise reached the intended beneficiary". Have you ever heard a top executive head of any other country publicly accept and go on record that 85% of the intended amount never reached the poor and needy? That 85% of the amount was swindled away by corrupt means?
Even this article admits it rather reluctantly: "Officials estimate that taxpayers have saved at least $9.4 billion from Aadhaar by weeding out “ghosts” and other improper beneficiaries of government services."
- haltingproblem 9y ago> The core issue being that for the poorest of the poor, privacy is secondary to survival. Privacy is probably not on their radar. However, Aadhaar is an authentication system not a tracking system. So privacy is not even relevant here but please correct me if I am mistaken.
- shripadk 9y agoYes you are right in that Aadhaar is currently an authentication system and not a tracking system. But there are definitely instances where Aadhaar data has leaked (not the biometrics, but identity information like Name, Address and Phone numbers) which rightly calls into question privacy related issues.
- captn3m0 9y agoThe issue with biometric leaks is that it could come from anywhere, like this leak from the PDS system (ironically) in Gujarat[0]. Using biometrics for authentication is like forcing everyone to use the same password everywhere. Aadhaar isn't the only biometric database in the country. [0]: https://www.medianama.com/2018/02/223-gujarat-bleeds-biometrics-uidai-says-aadhaar-biometrics-secure/ https://www.medianama.com/2018/02/223-gujarat-bleeds-biometr...
- shripadk 9y agoDamn that's scary to think that the government was so callous with biometric data. Like you mentioned in one of your other comments to someone else in the thread, it's wise to couple biometric scans with a passkey or even yubikey as Aadhaar number by itself is no longer a good first factor (especially with compromise of biometric data). I don't see how it's possible for the government to rollback collected biometric data so it makes more sense now to use multifactor authentication. Even though UIDAI's biometrics isn't directly compromised the fact that the local government was also collecting biometrics and that leaked makes it even worse. Now those same biometrics can be used to authenticate Aadhaar transactions. I see how this can be a major issue. This information was an eye opener for me. I learnt a lot from our discussions today. Thank you!
- hesarenu 9y agoI have seen some company use bio metric for login. Visa applications require them as well. Any other mechanisms might still get broken.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]