It’s stored hashed with 1000 iterations of PBKDF1: https://github.com/gwatts/pinfinder/blob/a3e1d1b709ad6c9a109795c0e711317f8f2089fc/pinfinder.go#L323 https://g

It’s stored hashed with 1000 iterations of PBKDF1: https://github.com/gwatts/pinfinder/blob/a3e1d1b709ad6c9a109795c0e711317f8f2089fc/pinfinder.go#L323 https://github.com/gwatts/pinfinder/blob/a3e1d1b709ad6c9a109... Note that this tool extracts the hash from a decrypted iTunes backup. That contains (nearly) all the device data, so by the time an attacker has that, they aren’t going to need much else. Apple could bind it to the hardware if they wanted to, but that’s going above and beyond, which I’m not sure is any use here.