I find the article much more convincing than your comment though. > Nothing nefarious about finding a good case... There is something nefarious with lying abo

I find the article much more convincing than your comment though. > Nothing nefarious about finding a good case... There is something nefarious with lying about, or being willfully ignorant about, needing the backdoor in the first place. When you testify to the Court and to Congress there is no other way, it can’t be because you didn’t bother to ask. > A method that is 90% ready just isn’t ready. If you look at the timeline the method was ready and demonstrated to the FBI within a month. That’s a lot faster than the courts could even begin to move on the case, and wouldn’t you like to think in a national security case the FBI would be working expoditiously to unlock the device rather than score political points? > The difficulties [of backdoors] seem to be exaggerated.... working flawlessly for Bitcoin already That’s a very interesting definition of “flawlessly” you’ve got there. I could cite the long list of grievously damaging government and private sector breaches, and just note that none of them were as enticing as a golden key to unlock global encrypted comms. Our security sucks enough without intentionally weakening it. But more importantly, only the law abiding citizens would be using the backdoored encryption. Real encryption doesn’t magically go away because you publish a broken algorithm.