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I agree with the EFF's position regarding backdoors, but this article isn't convincing. - There really isn't anything nefarious in trying to find a good case t

I agree with the EFF's position regarding backdoors, but this article isn't convincing. - There really isn't anything nefarious in trying to find a good case to set precedent. That's actually the EFF's (and ACLU, etc.) business model: find the most sympathetic plaintiff for the issue you want to litigate to improve your chances in court (and the court of public opinion). - A method that is "90% ready" just isn't ready. Not only are such numbers meaningless in such a project. It just doesn't matter, legally, if you gain such capabilities in the future. A good faith interpretation of the FBI's motivation must also accept that if(!) the FBI had any interest in the phone's content, that interest was urgent. I also consider the EFF's and tech community's technical arguments to be rather weak and transparent attempts to skirt the core issue: we don't want backdoors for governments, period. By suggesting technical difficulties they are trying to shift the debate from the political sphere to the technology. That's probably good for the cause, but it circumvents the mechanism we have established for policy debates, namely democracy. The difficulties also seem to be far exaggerated: a 1-of-2 encryption scheme should be possible. There are several such schemes (like 2-of-3) working flawlessly for Bitcoin already. Safekeeping of master decryption keys also seems to be a solved problem. Certificate Authorities, as just one example, seem to do so mostly without any hitches.

braythwayt 9y ago
> There really isn't anything nefarious in trying to find a good case to set precedent Far enough, however the FBI's argument was that they needed a backdoor to get into phones like this, when it turns out that they didn't need the back door at all, and not only did they purchase a "crack" to open the phone, they also had Apple's help and could have gotten the information they needed using the tools they already had at their disposal. As I read it, this is not about finding a nice court case, it's about misleading the courts with the respect to the necessity of the back door. In other words, they weren't finding a sympathetic case, they were manufacturing it.
- rdtsc 9y ago
  > it's about misleading the courts with the respect to the necessity of the back door. In other words, they weren't finding a sympathetic case, they were manufacturing it. Absolutely. Now they kinda of gave Comey the benefit of the doubt saying "he didn't know" but it turns out ROU team was doing it. --- The OIG report concluded that Director Comey didn’t know that his testimony was false at the time he gave it. But it was false, and technical staff in FBI’s own ROU knew it was false. --- Not sure what happened there. I think there are two levels of "truth" one is what is written and recorded, and the real "truth". How did ROU started working on the device to begin with. Did they go to the evidence box and started tinkering with the phone when CEAU wasn't watching? Did they clone the device and handed it to multiple teams "here if anyone of you can figure it out, you get an extra 10 days of vacation" or something like that. On the manufacturing part. FBI, likes to manufacture evidence and skirt around entrapment whenever possible. What better way to look important and get more power than making your own reality. Here is their informant infiltrating a mosque in Irvine, CA and radicalizing people. http://www.latimes.com/local/orangecounty/la-me-muslim-fbi-20151221-story.html http://www.latimes.com/local/orangecounty/la-me-muslim-fbi-2... he was reported to the, wait for it, ... FBI. There are other cases as well: https://theintercept.com/2015/01/16/latest-fbi-boast-disrupting-terror-u-s-plot-deserves-scrutiny-skepticism/ https://theintercept.com/2015/01/16/latest-fbi-boast-disrupt...
  - stevew20 9y ago
    It seems a very likely strategy for Comey (based on past instances of him lying under oath) to have tasked the unit with breaking into the phone, then simultaneously pushing on Apple to unlock it. In this scenario, all Comey had to do was NOT ACCEPT the final report from the unit working on the phone, and that project would remain at <100% indefinitely. In a military beaurocracy setting, until a work order or transfer order is signed off by the one who issued it, it is not legally binding as being completed. Also, easy for Comey to tell the unit not to contact him with any details so he wouldn't have to purjure himself. In any case, he really should be in jail, as he is a total sociopath and all of those FBI guys are guilty of watching kiddy porn.
    - colejohnson66 9y ago
SamPatt 9y ago
Safekeeping of keys is not a solved problem. There is something nefarious about trying to set precedent when the precedent is conscripting companies into the surveillance state. They lied about their capabilities in order to force a company to break their product on their behalf.
maxerickson 9y ago
And yet: As described earlier, our inquiry did not reveal that anyone in OTD had withheld knowledge of an existing FBI capability, as EAD Hess had feared. However, our inquiry suggests that CEAU did not pursue all possible avenues in the search for a solution. The CEAU Chief told the OIG that, after the outside vendor came forward, he became frustrated that the case against Apple could no longer go forward, and he vented his frustration to the ROU Chief. He acknowledged that during this conversation between the two, he expressed disappointment that the ROU Chief had engaged an outside vendor to assist with the Farook iPhone, asking the ROU Chief, “Why did you do that for?” According to the CEAU Chief, his unit did not ask CEAU’s partners to check with their outside vendors. CEAU was only interested in knowing what their partners had in hand – indicating that checking with “everybody” did not include OTD’s trusted vendors, at least in the CEAU Chief’s mind. However, we believe CEAU should have checked with OTD’s trusted vendors for possible solutions before advising OTD management, FBI leadership, or the USAO that there was no other technical alternative and that compelling Apple’s assistance was necessary to search the Farook iPhone. The guy supposed to be looking for technical solutions, upon finding someone had asked vendors about technical solutions: “Why did you do that for?”
- acejam 9y ago
  This says it all.
Kalium 9y ago
> I also consider the EFF's and tech community's technical arguments to be rather weak and transparent attempts to skirt the core issue: we don't want backdoors for governments, period. We don't really want them. However, by longstanding precedent they're entitled to them whenever the technological system at hand enables it. Telephony, postal service, and so on. You're absolutely right! Democracy is exactly the method to apply to a political issue. It's so applicable, we applied the democracy mechanism to this issue centuries ago and continue to do so. If we fall back to it here, we're going to lose, and we'll be forced to include backdoors in everything.
zaroth 9y ago
I find the article much more convincing than your comment though. > Nothing nefarious about finding a good case... There is something nefarious with lying about, or being willfully ignorant about, needing the backdoor in the first place. When you testify to the Court and to Congress there is no other way, it can’t be because you didn’t bother to ask. > A method that is 90% ready just isn’t ready. If you look at the timeline the method was ready and demonstrated to the FBI within a month. That’s a lot faster than the courts could even begin to move on the case, and wouldn’t you like to think in a national security case the FBI would be working expoditiously to unlock the device rather than score political points? > The difficulties [of backdoors] seem to be exaggerated.... working flawlessly for Bitcoin already That’s a very interesting definition of “flawlessly” you’ve got there. I could cite the long list of grievously damaging government and private sector breaches, and just note that none of them were as enticing as a golden key to unlock global encrypted comms. Our security sucks enough without intentionally weakening it. But more importantly, only the law abiding citizens would be using the backdoored encryption. Real encryption doesn’t magically go away because you publish a broken algorithm.
boomboomsubban 9y ago
> A method that is "90% ready" just isn't ready. Not only are such numbers meaningless in such a project. It just doesn't matter, legally, if you gain such capabilities in the future. A good faith interpretation of the FBI's motivation must also accept that if(!) the FBI had any interest in the phone's content, that interest was urgent. Any method they would have gotten from Apple was roughly zero percent ready, meaning the 90% one was more feasible than going through Apple.
- tedunangst 9y ago
  Isn't the absolute magnitude of the remaining work more relevant?
pvg 9y ago
There really isn't anything nefarious in trying to find a good case to set precedent. That's actually the EFF's (and ACLU, etc.) business model It's not a 'business model' and there is a fundamental difference between advocates cherry picking their cases and approach and the state and its law enforcement apparatus doing so. The latter demands a great deal more scrutiny. Safekeeping of master decryption keys also seems to be a solved problem. Certificate Authorities, as just one example, seem to do so mostly without any hitches. Those secrets are not nearly as valuable or potentially damaging and there are lots of mechanisms in place to externally mitigate and detect their potential loss and abuse.
jaclaz 9y ago
I completely agree with your interpretation, particularly because in these cases the 90-90 rule would apply: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ninety-ninety_rule https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ninety-ninety_rule BUT, IMHO another needed consideration should be about what was (reasonably) expected to be found on the device, and since - one way or the other it was unlocked - what was actually found on the device. My personal guess is nothing-nothing, some of the often forgotten news about the specific case: [1] The AppleID was changed after the phone was already in Government custody, thus self-sabotizing some possible recovery ways [2] The couple went into an extensive and thoroughful destruction of all the other electronic devices, exception made for the (county issued, i.e. "work only") iPhone [3] An actual statement by an investigator saying that most probably the phone contents (if any) were useless [4] The DA mentioned a mysterious "lying dormant cyber pathogen" among the reasons why it was vital to obtain access to the iPhone [1] https://www.wired.com/2016/02/apple-says-the-government-bungled-its-chance-to-hack-that-iphone/ https://www.wired.com/2016/02/apple-says-the-government-bung...? [2] http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/apple-must-help-hack-san-bernardino-shooters-phone-1.3451123 http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/apple-must-help-hack-san-ber... [3] https://theintercept.com/2016/02/26/farooks-iphone-is-probably-useless-even-the-police-say-so/ https://theintercept.com/2016/02/26/farooks-iphone-is-probab... [4] https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/04/san-bernardino-da-baffles-security-community-lying-dormant-cyber-pathogen-iphone https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/04/san-berna...
- IAmEveryone 9y ago
  I completely agree that backdoors are a terrible invasion of privacy, that law enforcement gained absolutely nothing in this case, and that Apple should be lauded for their bold opposition to these requests. I'm merely attacking the specific line of argumentation the EFF is using. I consider it both intellectually shoddy and bound to be counter-productive. (Unfortunately, HN doesn't appear to understand such nuances.)
michaelmrose 9y ago
I don't think the question is can we instantly access the data in this phone because trials don't last 10 seconds. The point is can we expect to be able to access this data in a time frame which is suitable for this evidence to be used at this trial. The answer is that there was no need for apple's assistance and Comey is a liar. The governments position was that this man and criminals like him would go free without forcing apple to backdoor their phones. A solution that is 90% ready works but may require significant work to be ready for an agent to plug in a phone push a button and get root. Anything else is pure wishful thinking on the part of law and order fans who don't want the law to be in the wrong on anything. The fact that it was factually ready in 3 weeks proves this beyond a shadow of a doubt. Neither an apple assisted solution nor the hack they were working on would have been ready to use tomorrow. The government stated that they needed apple to break ios in order to nail a creep. This was a lie. The actual worst case scenario isn't this scum getting off. The actual worst case scenario would be us buying the line of bs they are selling and giving up more of our privacy.
- IAmEveryone 9y ago
  You are extremely casual with the truth; Your post is choke full of inaccuracies. The major one is: > The government stated that they needed apple to break ios in order to nail a creep. This was a lie. It was not. The specific question was: "[are you] testifying today that you and/or contractors that you employ could not achieve this without demanding an unwilling partner do it” The answer was affirmative, and correct for that point in time. It wasn't quite the "whole truth", but it was true. And there are any number of reasons you'd not want an unfinished project to become public. Also: the government's position was never that "this man would go free" or that they intend "to nail a creep". That man/creep was dead.
  - michaelmrose 9y ago
    A lie by omission is still the lie. If you ever have to tell someone that you didn't tell them the complete truth what you really mean is that you lied to/misled them. Regarding being dead sorry I was thinking of the child porn case not the shooter my mistake.

braythwayt 9y ago

> There really isn't anything nefarious in trying to find a good case to set precedent Far enough, however the FBI's argument was that they needed a backdoor to get into phones like this, when it turns out that they didn't need the back door at all, and not only did they purchase a "crack" to open the phone, they also had Apple's help and could have gotten the information they needed using the tools they already had at their disposal. As I read it, this is not about finding a nice court case, it's about misleading the courts with the respect to the necessity of the back door. In other words, they weren't finding a sympathetic case, they were manufacturing it.

rdtsc 9y ago
> it's about misleading the courts with the respect to the necessity of the back door. In other words, they weren't finding a sympathetic case, they were manufacturing it. Absolutely. Now they kinda of gave Comey the benefit of the doubt saying "he didn't know" but it turns out ROU team was doing it. --- The OIG report concluded that Director Comey didn’t know that his testimony was false at the time he gave it. But it was false, and technical staff in FBI’s own ROU knew it was false. --- Not sure what happened there. I think there are two levels of "truth" one is what is written and recorded, and the real "truth". How did ROU started working on the device to begin with. Did they go to the evidence box and started tinkering with the phone when CEAU wasn't watching? Did they clone the device and handed it to multiple teams "here if anyone of you can figure it out, you get an extra 10 days of vacation" or something like that. On the manufacturing part. FBI, likes to manufacture evidence and skirt around entrapment whenever possible. What better way to look important and get more power than making your own reality. Here is their informant infiltrating a mosque in Irvine, CA and radicalizing people. http://www.latimes.com/local/orangecounty/la-me-muslim-fbi-20151221-story.html http://www.latimes.com/local/orangecounty/la-me-muslim-fbi-2... he was reported to the, wait for it, ... FBI. There are other cases as well: https://theintercept.com/2015/01/16/latest-fbi-boast-disrupting-terror-u-s-plot-deserves-scrutiny-skepticism/ https://theintercept.com/2015/01/16/latest-fbi-boast-disrupt...
- stevew20 9y ago
  It seems a very likely strategy for Comey (based on past instances of him lying under oath) to have tasked the unit with breaking into the phone, then simultaneously pushing on Apple to unlock it. In this scenario, all Comey had to do was NOT ACCEPT the final report from the unit working on the phone, and that project would remain at <100% indefinitely. In a military beaurocracy setting, until a work order or transfer order is signed off by the one who issued it, it is not legally binding as being completed. Also, easy for Comey to tell the unit not to contact him with any details so he wouldn't have to purjure himself. In any case, he really should be in jail, as he is a total sociopath and all of those FBI guys are guilty of watching kiddy porn.
  - colejohnson66 9y ago

SamPatt 9y ago

Safekeeping of keys is not a solved problem. There is something nefarious about trying to set precedent when the precedent is conscripting companies into the surveillance state. They lied about their capabilities in order to force a company to break their product on their behalf.

maxerickson 9y ago

And yet: As described earlier, our inquiry did not reveal that anyone in OTD had withheld knowledge of an existing FBI capability, as EAD Hess had feared. However, our inquiry suggests that CEAU did not pursue all possible avenues in the search for a solution. The CEAU Chief told the OIG that, after the outside vendor came forward, he became frustrated that the case against Apple could no longer go forward, and he vented his frustration to the ROU Chief. He acknowledged that during this conversation between the two, he expressed disappointment that the ROU Chief had engaged an outside vendor to assist with the Farook iPhone, asking the ROU Chief, “Why did you do that for?” According to the CEAU Chief, his unit did not ask CEAU’s partners to check with their outside vendors. CEAU was only interested in knowing what their partners had in hand – indicating that checking with “everybody” did not include OTD’s trusted vendors, at least in the CEAU Chief’s mind. However, we believe CEAU should have checked with OTD’s trusted vendors for possible solutions before advising OTD management, FBI leadership, or the USAO that there was no other technical alternative and that compelling Apple’s assistance was necessary to search the Farook iPhone. The guy supposed to be looking for technical solutions, upon finding someone had asked vendors about technical solutions: “Why did you do that for?”

acejam 9y ago
This says it all.

Kalium 9y ago

> I also consider the EFF's and tech community's technical arguments to be rather weak and transparent attempts to skirt the core issue: we don't want backdoors for governments, period. We don't really want them. However, by longstanding precedent they're entitled to them whenever the technological system at hand enables it. Telephony, postal service, and so on. You're absolutely right! Democracy is exactly the method to apply to a political issue. It's so applicable, we applied the democracy mechanism to this issue centuries ago and continue to do so. If we fall back to it here, we're going to lose, and we'll be forced to include backdoors in everything.

zaroth 9y ago

I find the article much more convincing than your comment though. > Nothing nefarious about finding a good case... There is something nefarious with lying about, or being willfully ignorant about, needing the backdoor in the first place. When you testify to the Court and to Congress there is no other way, it can’t be because you didn’t bother to ask. > A method that is 90% ready just isn’t ready. If you look at the timeline the method was ready and demonstrated to the FBI within a month. That’s a lot faster than the courts could even begin to move on the case, and wouldn’t you like to think in a national security case the FBI would be working expoditiously to unlock the device rather than score political points? > The difficulties [of backdoors] seem to be exaggerated.... working flawlessly for Bitcoin already That’s a very interesting definition of “flawlessly” you’ve got there. I could cite the long list of grievously damaging government and private sector breaches, and just note that none of them were as enticing as a golden key to unlock global encrypted comms. Our security sucks enough without intentionally weakening it. But more importantly, only the law abiding citizens would be using the backdoored encryption. Real encryption doesn’t magically go away because you publish a broken algorithm.

boomboomsubban 9y ago

> A method that is "90% ready" just isn't ready. Not only are such numbers meaningless in such a project. It just doesn't matter, legally, if you gain such capabilities in the future. A good faith interpretation of the FBI's motivation must also accept that if(!) the FBI had any interest in the phone's content, that interest was urgent. Any method they would have gotten from Apple was roughly zero percent ready, meaning the 90% one was more feasible than going through Apple.

tedunangst 9y ago
Isn't the absolute magnitude of the remaining work more relevant?

pvg 9y ago

There really isn't anything nefarious in trying to find a good case to set precedent. That's actually the EFF's (and ACLU, etc.) business model It's not a 'business model' and there is a fundamental difference between advocates cherry picking their cases and approach and the state and its law enforcement apparatus doing so. The latter demands a great deal more scrutiny. Safekeeping of master decryption keys also seems to be a solved problem. Certificate Authorities, as just one example, seem to do so mostly without any hitches. Those secrets are not nearly as valuable or potentially damaging and there are lots of mechanisms in place to externally mitigate and detect their potential loss and abuse.

jaclaz 9y ago

I completely agree with your interpretation, particularly because in these cases the 90-90 rule would apply: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ninety-ninety_rule https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ninety-ninety_rule BUT, IMHO another needed consideration should be about what was (reasonably) expected to be found on the device, and since - one way or the other it was unlocked - what was actually found on the device. My personal guess is nothing-nothing, some of the often forgotten news about the specific case: [1] The AppleID was changed after the phone was already in Government custody, thus self-sabotizing some possible recovery ways [2] The couple went into an extensive and thoroughful destruction of all the other electronic devices, exception made for the (county issued, i.e. "work only") iPhone [3] An actual statement by an investigator saying that most probably the phone contents (if any) were useless [4] The DA mentioned a mysterious "lying dormant cyber pathogen" among the reasons why it was vital to obtain access to the iPhone [1] https://www.wired.com/2016/02/apple-says-the-government-bungled-its-chance-to-hack-that-iphone/ https://www.wired.com/2016/02/apple-says-the-government-bung...? [2] http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/apple-must-help-hack-san-bernardino-shooters-phone-1.3451123 http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/apple-must-help-hack-san-ber... [3] https://theintercept.com/2016/02/26/farooks-iphone-is-probably-useless-even-the-police-say-so/ https://theintercept.com/2016/02/26/farooks-iphone-is-probab... [4] https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/04/san-bernardino-da-baffles-security-community-lying-dormant-cyber-pathogen-iphone https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/04/san-berna...

IAmEveryone 9y ago
I completely agree that backdoors are a terrible invasion of privacy, that law enforcement gained absolutely nothing in this case, and that Apple should be lauded for their bold opposition to these requests. I'm merely attacking the specific line of argumentation the EFF is using. I consider it both intellectually shoddy and bound to be counter-productive. (Unfortunately, HN doesn't appear to understand such nuances.)

michaelmrose 9y ago

I don't think the question is can we instantly access the data in this phone because trials don't last 10 seconds. The point is can we expect to be able to access this data in a time frame which is suitable for this evidence to be used at this trial. The answer is that there was no need for apple's assistance and Comey is a liar. The governments position was that this man and criminals like him would go free without forcing apple to backdoor their phones. A solution that is 90% ready works but may require significant work to be ready for an agent to plug in a phone push a button and get root. Anything else is pure wishful thinking on the part of law and order fans who don't want the law to be in the wrong on anything. The fact that it was factually ready in 3 weeks proves this beyond a shadow of a doubt. Neither an apple assisted solution nor the hack they were working on would have been ready to use tomorrow. The government stated that they needed apple to break ios in order to nail a creep. This was a lie. The actual worst case scenario isn't this scum getting off. The actual worst case scenario would be us buying the line of bs they are selling and giving up more of our privacy.

IAmEveryone 9y ago
You are extremely casual with the truth; Your post is choke full of inaccuracies. The major one is: > The government stated that they needed apple to break ios in order to nail a creep. This was a lie. It was not. The specific question was: "[are you] testifying today that you and/or contractors that you employ could not achieve this without demanding an unwilling partner do it” The answer was affirmative, and correct for that point in time. It wasn't quite the "whole truth", but it was true. And there are any number of reasons you'd not want an unfinished project to become public. Also: the government's position was never that "this man would go free" or that they intend "to nail a creep". That man/creep was dead.
- michaelmrose 9y ago
  A lie by omission is still the lie. If you ever have to tell someone that you didn't tell them the complete truth what you really mean is that you lied to/misled them. Regarding being dead sorry I was thinking of the child porn case not the shooter my mistake.