4 ms·
It depends on whether the asymmetric information problem is fixable. The usual reason why fixing it is hard is credibility. For example, in the used car market,
by pdonis 9y ago
It depends on whether the asymmetric information problem is fixable. The usual reason why fixing it is hard is credibility. For example, in the used car market, a seller who happens to have a car that is not a lemon has no way of credibly conveying that information to prospective buyers, since sellers of lemons can say all of the same things he can say. So the seller of a non-lemon will get no buyers unless he is lucky enough to come across a buyer who actually can tell that his car is not a lemon--i.e., for whom the information is already not asymmetric, without the seller having to say anything.
Note that branding is not necessarily a solution to this problem, except possibly in the short term. That is, a seller can work to establish a brand reputation--which, btw, will generally (by standard game theory arguments) include costly signaling, such as expensive advertising, that sellers of lemons cannot duplicate. But as soon as the brand reputation is established, the seller has an incentive to take advantage of it by gradually reducing quality. Buyers know that this incentive exists, which limits the degree to which they are willing to believe even costly signaling; and therefore establishing a brand reputation is not a long-term stable solution to asymmetric information.
The other potential solution is for credible third parties to exist who give unbiased and accurate quality ratings to the various sellers. But this, of course, is vulnerable to being gamed: sellers have an incentive to offer rewards to the third parties in exchange for more favorable ratings. This then becomes just another version of the brand reputation situation above: buyers know that the third parties will be tempted to sell better ratings to sellers, which limits the degree to which those ratings will be believed.