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They also will never drop windows because it's probably gonna be an extremely useful platform when the next generations of devices will come up, think of AR. T

They also will never drop windows because it's probably gonna be an extremely useful platform when the next generations of devices will come up, think of AR. The fact that they dropped the mobile market (where windows could not fit as very different hardware was involved in the beginning) doesn't mean they will miss the next shot too. They will have an entire ecosystem up and running, and windows 10- level flexible to be tailored to whatever comes. Of course it would be crazy for them to drop it now

Joeri 9y ago
The fact that they dropped the mobile market (where windows could not fit as very different hardware was involved in the beginning) doesn't mean they will miss the next shot too. Every single incarnation of windows mobile / phone was well tailored for the mobile hardware of the day. What sunk windows phone was not that it was slow, it was that it was late to go touch-first and failed to differentiate enough to make up for it. That and tightly controlling the vendors while up against android made the quality of windows phone itself irrelevant.
- bitmapbrother 9y ago
  You seem to be suffering from the same delusional thoughts that affected Myerson. This is such an utterly clueless explanation of why Windows Phone failed that it’s kind of stunning. Until, of course, you remember the culture-induced myopia I described yesterday: Myerson still has the Ballmer-esque presumption that Microsoft controlled its own destiny and could have leveraged its assets (like Office) to win the smartphone market, ignoring that by virtue of being late Windows Phone was a product competing against ecosystems, which meant no consumer demand, which meant no developers, topped off by the arrogance to dictate to OEMs and carriers what they could and could not do to the phone, destroying any chance at leveraging distribution to get critical mass… Interestingly, though, Myerson’s ridiculous assertion in a roundabout way shows how you change culture…In this case, Nadella effectively shunted Windows to its own division with all of the company’s other non-strategic assets, leaving Myerson and team to come to yesterday’s decision on their own. Remember, Nadella opposed the Nokia acquisition, but instead of simply dropping the axe on day one, thus wasting precious political capital, he let Windows give it their best shot and come to that conclusion on their own.
  - Joeri 9y ago
    Well, that's a very myopic view of what happened to windows mobile. Windows mobile and blackberry owned the mobile enterprise market for years. Then the iPhone came around and despite not having any ecosystem at all (or even native app capability) immediately started displacing both of them rapidly. Microsoft and RIM both gambled for a long time that ecosystem would keep windows mobile and BB OS in place, and only realized that it wouldn't once iPhone and Android had taken most of their market away. Microsoft then concluded from this that ecosystem didn't matter as much as people thought it did, and that if their offering was good enough the ecosystem would materialize by itself. Windows phone was never good enough compared to iOS and Android for that to happen, so it failed. But, the underlying theory was not crazy given what had just happened in the enterprise mobile market.

Joeri 9y ago

The fact that they dropped the mobile market (where windows could not fit as very different hardware was involved in the beginning) doesn't mean they will miss the next shot too. Every single incarnation of windows mobile / phone was well tailored for the mobile hardware of the day. What sunk windows phone was not that it was slow, it was that it was late to go touch-first and failed to differentiate enough to make up for it. That and tightly controlling the vendors while up against android made the quality of windows phone itself irrelevant.

bitmapbrother 9y ago
You seem to be suffering from the same delusional thoughts that affected Myerson. This is such an utterly clueless explanation of why Windows Phone failed that it’s kind of stunning. Until, of course, you remember the culture-induced myopia I described yesterday: Myerson still has the Ballmer-esque presumption that Microsoft controlled its own destiny and could have leveraged its assets (like Office) to win the smartphone market, ignoring that by virtue of being late Windows Phone was a product competing against ecosystems, which meant no consumer demand, which meant no developers, topped off by the arrogance to dictate to OEMs and carriers what they could and could not do to the phone, destroying any chance at leveraging distribution to get critical mass… Interestingly, though, Myerson’s ridiculous assertion in a roundabout way shows how you change culture…In this case, Nadella effectively shunted Windows to its own division with all of the company’s other non-strategic assets, leaving Myerson and team to come to yesterday’s decision on their own. Remember, Nadella opposed the Nokia acquisition, but instead of simply dropping the axe on day one, thus wasting precious political capital, he let Windows give it their best shot and come to that conclusion on their own.
- Joeri 9y ago
  Well, that's a very myopic view of what happened to windows mobile. Windows mobile and blackberry owned the mobile enterprise market for years. Then the iPhone came around and despite not having any ecosystem at all (or even native app capability) immediately started displacing both of them rapidly. Microsoft and RIM both gambled for a long time that ecosystem would keep windows mobile and BB OS in place, and only realized that it wouldn't once iPhone and Android had taken most of their market away. Microsoft then concluded from this that ecosystem didn't matter as much as people thought it did, and that if their offering was good enough the ecosystem would materialize by itself. Windows phone was never good enough compared to iOS and Android for that to happen, so it failed. But, the underlying theory was not crazy given what had just happened in the enterprise mobile market.