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Privacy, security, rights Managment. Not quite State level but close (because does that even exist?). It's celebrities that travel nearly most days of the year

Privacy, security, rights Managment. Not quite State level but close (because does that even exist?). It's celebrities that travel nearly most days of the years. Every place that's always in the news for something terrible is probably a destination at somepoint. Also stalkers, extortionists, kidnappers, they're very real. Also and I would think probably more pertinent is that given current events, for something decentralized to take off and for content to be shared semi-locally amongst a partially trusted network it would have to be encrypted with some pretty large keys for it to pass the muster of the initial user base. A lot of these people had their nudes stolen from iCloud for instance. Granted a lot of that was fishing but still if it's going to be adopted people want encryption. It'd probably be smart to put in really big language at the time of install a general introduction to best security practices... And if you really want to be compassionate to the users and little notifier whose nuisance level could be dialed down that periodically reminds them.

tomcam 9y ago
>It's celebrities that travel nearly most days of the years. Every place that's always in the news for something terrible is probably a destination at somepoint. Given that market, why not charge for MinimalBook as a premium experience instead of postulating an ill-defined “marketplace”?
brandmeyer 9y ago
Here's the thing. Encryption only allows you to protect the channel of information between two parties. Once the other party has the information you shared, they can in turn share it with whomever they wish. You can establish a private network amongst your selected peers. But you cannot prevent your peers from violating the network's privacy, either purposefully or accidentally. No amount of encryption can do that.
- wizardforhire 9y ago
  Right. But I'm thinking torrents and packets distributed to the local network of peers to ease the distributed bandwidth load. Granted a state level actor could potentially collect all data as they do now and have a hell of time trying to piece it all back together. That would take total knowledge of the network and the keys. But for users whom have permission to view the content granted to them through the "friending" process the last thing you want is for them to be able to mine their device or know what's being stored on their device. This would take a fixed install size with a flexible disc space to store popular files, something that would be clearly communicated at the time install of course. Nothing will stop people from pulling triggers other than culture. But making it difficult for the bad actors to do so seems like a good place to start. That and having a paper trail should shit hit the fan.
  - reitanqild 9y ago
    > But for users whom have permission to view the content granted to them through the "friending" process the last thing you want is for them to be able to mine their device or know what's being stored on their device. I assume them is a reference to state level actor? At least to me it is not immediately obvious and I think I misread it the first time.
    - loup-vaillant 9y ago
      Looks like wizardforhire was talking about something like distributed encrypted backups. The simple version is, others store your stuff for you (and you store theirs), but they can't read it, because only you have the key. Add to that a way to authorise people to decrypt your stuff (and, ideally, ways to revoke those rights), and you get the the whole thing.
      - wizardforhire 9y ago
        This is exactly what I was attempting to convey.
        reitanqild 9y ago
        Distributed backup already exists and can possibly work. But IIReadC you wanted to cache media on peers devices to allow them to see/listen to it. That cannot work unless you trust your friends completely (or keep your friends under constant surveillance, and hardly even then) as once they see it on their screen they can photograph or record your media, if necessary using an external device (e.g. a camera) and store it or share it. Also, once your friends has access to it that makes your friends a target for bad actors that might want to trick or coerce your friends into sharing.
  - brandmeyer 9y ago
    > But for users whom have permission to view the content granted to them through the "friending" process the last thing you want is for them to be able to mine their device or know what's being stored on their device. This is just another form of digital restrictions management (aka DRM). I think you'll find that most of the engineers that are opposed in principle to the gov-tech surveillance complex are also opposed in principle to DRM. It is at least possible to build an open-source distributed social networking application that gives you most of the features you described, and in particular, will make it impractical to vacuum up whole social network graphs. But at some point, ordinary netizens are going to have to learn some basic information theory. Just as commando clubbing is going to lead to some paparazzi getting vagina pics, nude selfies are going to get out beyond your ability to control.

tomcam 9y ago

>It's celebrities that travel nearly most days of the years. Every place that's always in the news for something terrible is probably a destination at somepoint. Given that market, why not charge for MinimalBook as a premium experience instead of postulating an ill-defined “marketplace”?

brandmeyer 9y ago

Here's the thing. Encryption only allows you to protect the channel of information between two parties. Once the other party has the information you shared, they can in turn share it with whomever they wish. You can establish a private network amongst your selected peers. But you cannot prevent your peers from violating the network's privacy, either purposefully or accidentally. No amount of encryption can do that.

wizardforhire 9y ago
Right. But I'm thinking torrents and packets distributed to the local network of peers to ease the distributed bandwidth load. Granted a state level actor could potentially collect all data as they do now and have a hell of time trying to piece it all back together. That would take total knowledge of the network and the keys. But for users whom have permission to view the content granted to them through the "friending" process the last thing you want is for them to be able to mine their device or know what's being stored on their device. This would take a fixed install size with a flexible disc space to store popular files, something that would be clearly communicated at the time install of course. Nothing will stop people from pulling triggers other than culture. But making it difficult for the bad actors to do so seems like a good place to start. That and having a paper trail should shit hit the fan.
- reitanqild 9y ago
  > But for users whom have permission to view the content granted to them through the "friending" process the last thing you want is for them to be able to mine their device or know what's being stored on their device. I assume them is a reference to state level actor? At least to me it is not immediately obvious and I think I misread it the first time.
  - loup-vaillant 9y ago
    Looks like wizardforhire was talking about something like distributed encrypted backups. The simple version is, others store your stuff for you (and you store theirs), but they can't read it, because only you have the key. Add to that a way to authorise people to decrypt your stuff (and, ideally, ways to revoke those rights), and you get the the whole thing.
    - wizardforhire 9y ago
      This is exactly what I was attempting to convey.
      - reitanqild 9y ago
        Distributed backup already exists and can possibly work. But IIReadC you wanted to cache media on peers devices to allow them to see/listen to it. That cannot work unless you trust your friends completely (or keep your friends under constant surveillance, and hardly even then) as once they see it on their screen they can photograph or record your media, if necessary using an external device (e.g. a camera) and store it or share it. Also, once your friends has access to it that makes your friends a target for bad actors that might want to trick or coerce your friends into sharing.
- brandmeyer 9y ago
  > But for users whom have permission to view the content granted to them through the "friending" process the last thing you want is for them to be able to mine their device or know what's being stored on their device. This is just another form of digital restrictions management (aka DRM). I think you'll find that most of the engineers that are opposed in principle to the gov-tech surveillance complex are also opposed in principle to DRM. It is at least possible to build an open-source distributed social networking application that gives you most of the features you described, and in particular, will make it impractical to vacuum up whole social network graphs. But at some point, ordinary netizens are going to have to learn some basic information theory. Just as commando clubbing is going to lead to some paparazzi getting vagina pics, nude selfies are going to get out beyond your ability to control.