(Apologies I don't have longer to write up what might be interesting to read of his, will do my best for a few minutes!) What I find his most interesting core

(Apologies I don't have longer to write up what might be interesting to read of his, will do my best for a few minutes!) What I find his most interesting core claims are basically: "human and animal brains aren't spookily special in some non-physical way, and there are physical explanations for things we've simply failed to imagine and accept yet". And answering the "well whatabout [spookily special sounding thing]?" questions that naturally arise after that are the real fun challenge. But doing so is really tough, and often requires multiple long-held assumptions be questioned in succession, which is why so much of his work is on the process of questioning beliefs (and where his "thinking tools", thought experiments etc. really shine). Re: "Dennett also tried to deny that we have dream experiences, calling it coming-to-seem-to-remember upon waking up", he's said himself[0] that is a myth based on mischaracterization of his work[1]: > More than a few people apparently suppose that I espouse and defend the bizarre 'cassette theory' of dreaming in 'Are Dreams Experiences? '1 Emmett speaks, for instance, of "Dennett's defense of the cassette theory". Since more than a few suppose this, it must be because of obscurity or misdirection in my paper, for I do not end up espousing the theory, and am quite explicit about it. I concoct the cassette theory as a foil, as an alternative to what I call the received view, precisely in order to raise and investigate the question of what in fact would settle the issue between two such drastic rivals. From what you wrote there are a couple of characterizations of Dennett's positions that suggest you might still enjoy giving some of his work another go with a generous mindset, e.g.: > Taking Dennett seriously entails denying any sort of internal experience I suspect Dennett wouldn't deny people perceive internal experience, heck -- evidence of that has been serialized right in your comment. He accounts for each of the phenomenon you describe (mental imagery, dreams as you mentioned, inner dialogue, pain) in his work, just not ascribing any fundamentally non-physical traits to the special-personal-feeling-ness of them. [0]: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00357702 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00357702 [1]: It's not hard to imagine how Dennett's claims could end up so often being mischaracterized (even by academic philosophers) -- the stuff he's claiming is subtle and (by its mind-blowing nature) hard to accept! So if someone hasn't yet grokked it, and they re-tell it how they stored it, the reader is doomed to never take seriously that kooky philosopher's claims.