4 ms·
I’d say for your email that yes, you’re being overly cautious. For Troy’s recently launched https://haveibeenpwned.com/Passwords https://haveibeenpwned.com/Pass
by robin_reala 9y ago
I’d say for your email that yes, you’re being overly cautious. For Troy’s recently launched https://haveibeenpwned.com/Passwords https://haveibeenpwned.com/Passwords I probably wouldn’t use that myself, but he makes a reasonable case for why it’s secure.
- kaoD 9y agoThere's a 100% safe API for password search where you SHA1 your password and query the first 5 characters only. Even if you don't trust that form to behave as promised, you can do the query yourself. https://haveibeenpwned.com/API/v2#SearchingPwnedPasswordsByRange https://haveibeenpwned.com/API/v2#SearchingPwnedPasswordsByR...
- CodesInChaos 9y agoI consider the security of the 5 char API acceptable, but it still leaks 20 bits of information about the password to HIBP, so it's certainly not 100% safe.
- kaoD 9y ago20 bits of the password hash. I can't think of a way to use that information maliciously, can you?
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- comex 9y agoIt depends on whether the hash is actually in the database or not. If it is, then one of the hashes returned corresponds to your password. But the hashing is done by HIBP itself, so a hypothetical evil Troy could determine the actual values of those passwords. If he determined who you are, perhaps by correlating requests with email submissions on the main HIBP site, he could then try to access your account on another site with each of those passwords, in the hope that you reused the same password on multiple sites. The docs say: > On average, a range search returns 478 hash suffixes which is low enough that one could potentially try them all in a reasonable amount of time, even taking rate limiting into account. ...However, the leaks that go into the database typically contain username/password pairs, not just passwords. So if your password is in the database because your account was pwned (as opposed to the account of someone who happened to pick the same password as you), and the username is reasonably identifiable, anyone who downloaded the original leak could do the same thing, except knowing exactly which password to try rather than having to go through 478 of them! And of course, the whole point of the password lookup is to inform you that your password is compromised and you need to stop using it. If you’re diligent, evil-Troy would only have a rather limited window to attack you before you changed your password on the relevant sites following a positive result. That is, assuming the API is honest and returns all the hashes it knows… In theory it could hold some back.
- jazoom 9y agoI probably trust Troy with my passwords more than I trust myself with them.
- dbfafb 9y agoThats how low the trust in passwords has got nowadays brings up the question: why are we still using passwords ?
- chopin 9y agoWhat is a good alternative? A device of any kind isn't good enough (eg. at border crossings or when lost otherwise). Biometrics can be a substitute for a user name but never for a password.
- jessaustin 9y agoMost sites are either high enough value that they should do the hard things, or they should outsource identification in some way. It is ridiculous that low-value sites use passwords, especially where cookies by themselves would suffice.
- macintux 9y agoOutsourcing authentication is tricky. Some of most likely sources are ones that many of us don't particularly trust.
- jessaustin 9y agoSure, outsourcing is tricky, but apparently so are passwords? One failure mode it doesn't have is "a bunch of passwords got pwned and my company is at fault". I do agree that the current schemes such as OAuth2 have odious implications. I don't think that the design space is completely explored, however. By relying solely on emailed and browser-stored tokens with judicious lifetimes, a site could outsource to email providers in a pretty secure way.