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Shit I got mine through Amazon a few months ago and was a bit worried it could be compromised. My paranoia is kicking in a bit more now after this article. Do y

Shit I got mine through Amazon a few months ago and was a bit worried it could be compromised. My paranoia is kicking in a bit more now after this article. Do you have any recommendations on checking that my Ledger isn't compromised? Ledger has some suggestions on their site, but as far as I understand they only check the integrity of the wallet apps.

StavrosK 9y ago
From what the article says, you basically can't be sure, unless you check the hardware. I would advise at least flashing the original firmware that you can get from Ledger themselves.
- fokinsean 9y ago
  Ok thanks will do.
- fokinsean 9y ago
  I just saw Ledger posted this. https://www.ledger.fr/2018/03/20/firmware-1-4-deep-dive-security-fixes/ https://www.ledger.fr/2018/03/20/firmware-1-4-deep-dive-secu... Sounds like it will check if it is compromised via the update.
- gh02t 9y ago
  Am I correct in understanding that the exploit would most likely be cleared by re-flashing the firmware to a known good image before you use it? Especially if you did so using JTAG it seems like it'd be very difficult (albeit probably not impossible) for the firmware modifications described in the article to persist through a reflash as long as you're reasonably confident that the hardware itself hasn't been altered. That doesn't get rid of the evil maid scenario, but it does get rid of the supply chain attack, which is IMO the more concerning one. Evil maid attacks can be mitigated by physical security, but the supply chain attack is out of your control.
  - StavrosK 9y ago
    Yes, and that's what the update does. Since the bootloader wasn't modified (at least with this particular attack), flashing a known-good image fixes it.
  - aeternus 9y ago
    The problem is, if you flash with JTAG you're basically just trusting your host computer not to be compromised. And isn't not having to trust your host computer the entire point of a hardware wallet?
    - gh02t 9y ago
      Big difference, you're only trusting the host computer (and the JTAG dongle) once. This is manageable, use an airgapped junk laptop with no HDD or similar if you're ultra paranoid. Sure perhaps the firmware is compromised and leaking data through some super exotic attack but I mean come on. That should give you a pretty reasonable level of confidence. You can never 100% trust a device you didn't design and fabricate every aspect of yourself, there's always some risk with any hardware token. I'd also argue that trusting your host computer is certainly better than trusting the supplier. Shifting the burden of trust from a device you don't control to one you do is at least an improvement.
lawlessone 9y ago
unsure how feasible this is , but maybe check if they have a software version of their key generator and confirm the codes you use in that are identical to what your device displays.
- StavrosK 9y ago
  That will completely defeat the purpose of having a hardware wallet, as you will be compromising the keys by divulging them to a networked computer.
  - dekz 9y ago
    run https://github.com/iancoleman/bip39 https://github.com/iancoleman/bip39 on an airgapped laptop
ghthor 9y ago
Move you coins to a new wallet addr, generated offline, and do the reflashing as others have commented.

StavrosK 9y ago

From what the article says, you basically can't be sure, unless you check the hardware. I would advise at least flashing the original firmware that you can get from Ledger themselves.

fokinsean 9y ago
Ok thanks will do.
fokinsean 9y ago
I just saw Ledger posted this. https://www.ledger.fr/2018/03/20/firmware-1-4-deep-dive-security-fixes/ https://www.ledger.fr/2018/03/20/firmware-1-4-deep-dive-secu... Sounds like it will check if it is compromised via the update.
gh02t 9y ago
Am I correct in understanding that the exploit would most likely be cleared by re-flashing the firmware to a known good image before you use it? Especially if you did so using JTAG it seems like it'd be very difficult (albeit probably not impossible) for the firmware modifications described in the article to persist through a reflash as long as you're reasonably confident that the hardware itself hasn't been altered. That doesn't get rid of the evil maid scenario, but it does get rid of the supply chain attack, which is IMO the more concerning one. Evil maid attacks can be mitigated by physical security, but the supply chain attack is out of your control.
- StavrosK 9y ago
  Yes, and that's what the update does. Since the bootloader wasn't modified (at least with this particular attack), flashing a known-good image fixes it.
- aeternus 9y ago
  The problem is, if you flash with JTAG you're basically just trusting your host computer not to be compromised. And isn't not having to trust your host computer the entire point of a hardware wallet?
  - gh02t 9y ago
    Big difference, you're only trusting the host computer (and the JTAG dongle) once. This is manageable, use an airgapped junk laptop with no HDD or similar if you're ultra paranoid. Sure perhaps the firmware is compromised and leaking data through some super exotic attack but I mean come on. That should give you a pretty reasonable level of confidence. You can never 100% trust a device you didn't design and fabricate every aspect of yourself, there's always some risk with any hardware token. I'd also argue that trusting your host computer is certainly better than trusting the supplier. Shifting the burden of trust from a device you don't control to one you do is at least an improvement.

lawlessone 9y ago

unsure how feasible this is , but maybe check if they have a software version of their key generator and confirm the codes you use in that are identical to what your device displays.

StavrosK 9y ago
That will completely defeat the purpose of having a hardware wallet, as you will be compromising the keys by divulging them to a networked computer.
- dekz 9y ago
  run https://github.com/iancoleman/bip39 https://github.com/iancoleman/bip39 on an airgapped laptop

ghthor 9y ago

Move you coins to a new wallet addr, generated offline, and do the reflashing as others have commented.