You stated as fact that DNSSEC was badly designed, specifically because its designers do not understand the Internet threat model. I pointed out that the desig

You stated as fact that DNSSEC was badly designed, specifically because its designers do not understand the Internet threat model. I pointed out that the design for offline signing makes for interesting use cases. You now claim that every real world deployment is online signed, which is not my experience. At least you acknowledge real world deployments. That has nothing to do with the complexity of pinpointing a connection to break, and nowhere did I make the claim that any attacks are straightforward. I did make the point that it is not easier and that it may very well be more complex. Pinpointing a TLS stream and inserting a false certificate is trivial if you posess a valid CA key, pinpointing the DNS query corresponding to a specific TLS stream is an added complexity (especially where multiple resolvers can be involved, where you also run the risk of being stuck in a cache). I'm not sure what kind of TLS stack ever delivered telemetry on valid signatures post facto, unless you refer to web browsers on the public Internet which is a different question entirely.