6 ms·
Plenty of published attacks are not all that practical. There are plenty of security researchers that would like to have some nice attacks on their CVs. If you
by phicoh 9y ago
Plenty of published attacks are not all that practical. There are plenty of security researchers that would like to have some nice attacks on their CVs.
If you like the security of HSTS, then I guess STS is for you. Personally I'd like something better then just blindly trusting the network the first time you try to connect to something.
- tptacek 9y agoSecurity researchers generally do not in fact spend a lot of time attacking systems that nobody uses. But in the sense that you're referring to, BIND, the de facto standard Internet DNS server, has one of the worst records in all of software security.
- xorcist 9y agoYou keep saying that nobody uses it, which isn't true. It's been deployed in the real world for some time now, securing some real systems. The threat model is different than for public CA TLS and not any less secure.
- tptacek 9y agoIf I published the secret key bits for the root KSK on Pastebin, right now, who --- specifically --- would be endangered?
- xorcist 9y agoThe fact that real world public systems such as SSH and SMTP rely on it has led to people relying on it in other protocols as well, where data is transferred between two parties and it is convenient to rely on established infrastructure for key rollovers and distributed trust. It's not a bad idea where the trust model is a little more complex than two parties exchanging keys on a regular schedule. Public implementation leaves a little to be desired, but that doesn't mean the protocol is ill designed.
- tptacek 9y agoCan you actually answer the question I asked?
- xorcist 9y agoI did answer with two specific examples of public protocols that can rely on DNSSEC. The fact that I will not point out specific endpoints where those or similar policies are in use should not be too surprising. Real world people use SSHFP and DANE, and those would stop working if zones suddently didn't validate.
- tptacek 9y agoAll you did was say that there are two protocols that have some kind of DNSSEC integration. That wasn't the question I asked. Lots of things have DNSSEC integrations that nobody relies on. Is the answer to my question "I don't know"?
- xorcist 9y agoNo, it is not. I don't understand why you are so confrontative. The answer is that at the very least those who rely on SSHFP and DANE will rely on DNSSEC. There are also proprietary protocols which have chosen to rely on it. Unless your real argument is that no one has ever used that in production, anywhere, that should be plenty by way of example.
- tptacek 9y agoMost (maybe all?) people who use SSHFP would be no worse off were SSHFP to suddenly stop working, since SSH relies on key continuity, and the introduction-connection security risk is one that virtually everyone who uses SSH already mitigates manually. So, no, you have not actually established that anyone would be endangered were the root KSK private bits published on Pastebin. I suspect, in all seriousness, that the answer to my question is "in reality, nobody would be endangered".