4 ms·
Master passwords have a very narrow threat model that they are actually protecting against: it's protecting against people who have access to the password datab
by jcranmer 9y ago
Master passwords have a very narrow threat model that they are actually protecting against: it's protecting against people who have access to the password database (i.e., filesystem access) but not people who have access to ptrace-privileges (i.e., the ability to read the password directly out of process memory). Which pretty much means the only realistic use case is someone stole your laptop, but full-disk encryption is a much more relevant solution.
Mozilla has known for a very long time that the master password system isn't very effective. Even a decade ago, I remember them recommending not using it.
- QasimK 9y agoCan I clarify the distinction between the two capabilities? Are you saying that if I download and execute e.g. “fake-meme-creator” which turns out to be malware for whatever reason, then it can read the filesystem as any normal process can, but it cannot access ptrace? If this is the case, I’d consider it to be useful because in general I don’t trust apps as a rule.
- jcranmer 9y agoThe way most systems are configured, your fake-meme-creator could access ptrace and the filesystem.
- s_gourichon 9y agoWhat is "most systems"? A few years ago this was true. A decent distribution nowadays sets /proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope to disallow any process to spy on other processes. ptrace_scope was apparently introduced in 2011-2012, see https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commits/a2e5790d841658485d642196dbb0927303d6c22f/security/yama/yama_lsm.c https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commits/a2e5790d841658485d... For more information: https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/security/Yama.txt https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/security/Yama.txt https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ptrace https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ptrace https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=2d514487faf188938a4ee4fb3464eeecfbdcf8eb https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/lin... (via https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/Roadmap/KernelHardening#ptrace_Protection https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/Roadmap/KernelHardening... )
- cozzyd 9y agoYeah but anyone developing will likely turn that off as it interferes with attaching gdb/strace/etc
- vbezhenar 9y agoThat's why my passwords in text file and I consider it fine. If someone breaks into my machine and I won't notice it, password will be keylogged anyway. The only true defense would be hardware-protected external password storage, but I'm not aware of any.
- paulryanrogers 9y agoYubikey
- vbezhenar 9y agoAre you sure it can store passwords and decrypt them with required touch? What's its memory?
- gry 9y agoYou can use a YubiKey for a portion of a master password. This is best used by manually typing "correct" and autocompleting the latter portion with plenty of entryop of the password/phrase "battery horse staple" from the key. This way, if someone steals the key, you've still got a secret. You'll still need a password manager to store the unique passwords for your services. https://www.yubico.com/support/knowledge-base/categories/articles/core-static-password-features/ https://www.yubico.com/support/knowledge-base/categories/art... https://www.yubico.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Yubico_WhitePaper_Static_Password_Function.pdf https://www.yubico.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Yubico_Whi... EDIT: Explanation
- vbezhenar 9y agoI think that advanced malware can intercept this master password and decrypt all data. I had in thought some hardware, which stores all passwords, reveals only metadata and to actually retrieve a single password, you have to physically interact with device (tap it, for example). In this case even if malware has full control over your PC, it can't retrieve all passwords, only those you've actually used.
- 9y ago
- magnat 9y ago> Which pretty much means the only realistic use case is someone stole your laptop There is also case of "someone stole your backup", which is also quote realistic, especially when using third-party storage services.
- signal11 9y agoThe “narrow threat model” actually applies to a very common social scenario where people share computers. For instance a family member might want to play Steam games, or print, or simply browse the web. Most people are not going to create a guest account for that. There passwords are then at risk if not adequately protected. Even in work contexts, “hey can I use your computer to print something? Mine is frozen” is very common. There was a similar discussion on the chromium tracker when they started storing passwords. I believe Chrome now use OS services (DPAPI on Windows and Keychain on MacOS) to protect passwords.
- gruez 9y agoworkstation access + admin user[1] = game over from a security point of view. at that point they can install a rootkit and bypass all your fancy DPAPI/keychain protections. [1] before you say "but I got password on my sudo!", there's nothing preventing someone from aliasing sudo to sudo bash -c "/tmp/evil.sh; $*"
- smacktoward 9y ago> Mozilla has known for a very long time that the master password system isn't very effective. Even a decade ago, I remember them recommending not using it. A feature that users would be better off not using is a feature that should be removed, IMHO.