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>My point is that functionalist accounts of the property of e.g. 'being in pain' are transparently not accounts of anything we can recognize as potentially bein

>My point is that functionalist accounts of the property of e.g. 'being in pain' are transparently not accounts of anything we can recognize as potentially being a phenomenal property. To me this is assuming more than we have a right to. It's presupposing an ontological distinction between phenomenal appearances and functional processing. Sure, we have an intuition that says they are distinct as well as explanatory gaps that cause us to question such an identity. But that in itself isn't enough. >but in the absence of any positive argument to this effect, why assume so? Depends on what you consider a positive argument. There are certainly many reasons to prefer a functionalist approach, e.g. its the most parsimonious way to cash out the correlations between brain states and phenomenal states, it doesn't suffer from the combination problem, inverted spectrum/valence problems, etc. >None of Searle's arguments against functionalism rely on the premise that physicalism is false. It depends on what you mean by physicalism. Often there's an ambiguity between physicalism and materialism, so let me clarify. Physicalism is the idea that brain processes are logically identical to phenomenal properties. To put it another way, there's no possible world where you have physical properties identical to this world that doesn't have consciousness. But physics tells us that physical properties just are sets of physical interactions. Thus physicalism leads directly to substance independence, and so a perfect simulation of a brain would be conscious. >There isn't any distinction between feeling pain and seeming to feel pain. I agree, but the point of the "it seems that P" is to cast the problem in a theory-neutral manner. You take functionalism to be a non-starter as an explanation of consciousness, and so you're quick to erase the "it seems that..." from the equation. This wording is necessary to avoid our biases from infecting our language thus biasing the investigation. The point of referencing Chalmers paper was for his exploration of the problem space that was theory-neutral. I disagree with Chalmers' conclusions but he always offers good exposition.

foldr 9y ago
> It's presupposing an ontological distinction between phenomenal appearances and functional processing. Sure, we have an intuition that says they are distinct as well as explanatory gaps that cause us to question such an identity. But that in itself isn't enough. Right, we agree on where we disagree. Probably not much point in hashing out this long-standing philosophical debate in HN comments. >Physicalism is the idea that brain processes are logically identical to phenomenal properties. That's a rather boutique definition of physicalism. Standard definitions (e.g. "the thesis that everything is physical", according to the Stanford Encylopedia) make no reference at all to the brain. >But physics tells us that physical properties just are sets of physical interactions. Thus physicalism leads directly to substance independence Hmm, that seems like a total non sequitur to me. I'm sure people have constructed arguments to that effect, but it's very far from obvious that physicalism entails substance independence. Searle certainly doesn't think so. I don't really understand your last paragraph. As far as I can tell, you don't think we should start with the assumption that people feel pain, but only with the assumption that it seems to people that they feel pain. But that just dodges the main issue. If people don't really feel pain, then most of the philosophical problems we're talking about dissolve immediately. On the other hand, if they do in fact feel pain, then these problems remain, regardless of whether or not we have an account of why it seems to them that they feel pain. As Chalmers says, to really get anywhere with this line of argument, you end up having to deny that people really do feel pain -- which is absurd.
- hackinthebochs 9y ago
  >That's a rather boutique definition of physicalism... make no reference at all to the brain. Perhaps my definition was too on the nose. Going by the SEP: "Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical". Supervenes on the physical, at least in the context of consciousness, implies substance independence of consciousness. Chalmers depends on this understanding in his zombie argument. Just to belabor the point, we can posit some property of physical matter that entails conscious experience only in certain kinds of physical processes (say in biological brains but not in microchips). This difference-making property's actions either are or are not mediated through physical interactions. If it is mediated through physical interactions, then we can include those interactions in the simulation, thus the property obtains in microchips, contradicting the premise. If it is not mediated through physical interactions, then by definition it's mode of influence is non-physical. But this contradicts the premise that "everything [including the mind] supervenes on the physical" (i.e. we have a change in consciousness but no change in physical properties). Chalmers cashes out such a difference-making property of physical matter as his microphenomenal properties in panpsychism. But importantly, this isn't Physicalism (his zombie argument is specifically against Physicalism). He argues for an expanded notion of the physical world that includes microphenomenal properties at the base. Just to tie all this back to Searle, from this discussion it seems clear that Searle cannot be a physicalist under this understanding. >I don't really understand your last paragraph. As far as I can tell, you don't think we should start with the assumption that people feel pain, but only with the assumption that it seems to people that they feel pain. I agree that people feel pain. The problem is that there is some ambiguity in common usage that can mislead and confuse the issue. For example, if I stub my toe and I shout ouch, you would say that I'm in pain. But in the context of philosophy of mind, we can't assume that from only outward appearances. So my characterization is an effort to shed all possibility of misunderstanding by zeroing in on the phenomenal character of the thing, as well as the only indisputable statement of fact that describes our relationship to the phenomenal character. So in this case "I am in pain" is operationalized as "It seems that [pain quale]". The "it seems that..." is important because we cannot be mistaken about seemings, i.e. it is not possible that an evil demon or simulation can trick us into thinking something seems a certain way while not being the case that it seems that way. But once phenomenal consciousness is operationalized as such, it becomes clear that functional explanations cannot be ruled out simply by definition.

foldr 9y ago

> It's presupposing an ontological distinction between phenomenal appearances and functional processing. Sure, we have an intuition that says they are distinct as well as explanatory gaps that cause us to question such an identity. But that in itself isn't enough. Right, we agree on where we disagree. Probably not much point in hashing out this long-standing philosophical debate in HN comments. >Physicalism is the idea that brain processes are logically identical to phenomenal properties. That's a rather boutique definition of physicalism. Standard definitions (e.g. "the thesis that everything is physical", according to the Stanford Encylopedia) make no reference at all to the brain. >But physics tells us that physical properties just are sets of physical interactions. Thus physicalism leads directly to substance independence Hmm, that seems like a total non sequitur to me. I'm sure people have constructed arguments to that effect, but it's very far from obvious that physicalism entails substance independence. Searle certainly doesn't think so. I don't really understand your last paragraph. As far as I can tell, you don't think we should start with the assumption that people feel pain, but only with the assumption that it seems to people that they feel pain. But that just dodges the main issue. If people don't really feel pain, then most of the philosophical problems we're talking about dissolve immediately. On the other hand, if they do in fact feel pain, then these problems remain, regardless of whether or not we have an account of why it seems to them that they feel pain. As Chalmers says, to really get anywhere with this line of argument, you end up having to deny that people really do feel pain -- which is absurd.

hackinthebochs 9y ago
>That's a rather boutique definition of physicalism... make no reference at all to the brain. Perhaps my definition was too on the nose. Going by the SEP: "Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical". Supervenes on the physical, at least in the context of consciousness, implies substance independence of consciousness. Chalmers depends on this understanding in his zombie argument. Just to belabor the point, we can posit some property of physical matter that entails conscious experience only in certain kinds of physical processes (say in biological brains but not in microchips). This difference-making property's actions either are or are not mediated through physical interactions. If it is mediated through physical interactions, then we can include those interactions in the simulation, thus the property obtains in microchips, contradicting the premise. If it is not mediated through physical interactions, then by definition it's mode of influence is non-physical. But this contradicts the premise that "everything [including the mind] supervenes on the physical" (i.e. we have a change in consciousness but no change in physical properties). Chalmers cashes out such a difference-making property of physical matter as his microphenomenal properties in panpsychism. But importantly, this isn't Physicalism (his zombie argument is specifically against Physicalism). He argues for an expanded notion of the physical world that includes microphenomenal properties at the base. Just to tie all this back to Searle, from this discussion it seems clear that Searle cannot be a physicalist under this understanding. >I don't really understand your last paragraph. As far as I can tell, you don't think we should start with the assumption that people feel pain, but only with the assumption that it seems to people that they feel pain. I agree that people feel pain. The problem is that there is some ambiguity in common usage that can mislead and confuse the issue. For example, if I stub my toe and I shout ouch, you would say that I'm in pain. But in the context of philosophy of mind, we can't assume that from only outward appearances. So my characterization is an effort to shed all possibility of misunderstanding by zeroing in on the phenomenal character of the thing, as well as the only indisputable statement of fact that describes our relationship to the phenomenal character. So in this case "I am in pain" is operationalized as "It seems that [pain quale]". The "it seems that..." is important because we cannot be mistaken about seemings, i.e. it is not possible that an evil demon or simulation can trick us into thinking something seems a certain way while not being the case that it seems that way. But once phenomenal consciousness is operationalized as such, it becomes clear that functional explanations cannot be ruled out simply by definition.