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>Neither do rain storms, but as Searle puts it, no-one would expect a computer simulation of a rain storm to actually make anyone wet. Of course not, but that'

>Neither do rain storms, but as Searle puts it, no-one would expect a computer simulation of a rain storm to actually make anyone wet. Of course not, but that's because the simulation doesn't have the right kind of causal relationship with my head to cause my head to get wet. But it might have the right kind of causal relationship with a simulated head to cause it to get wet. The analogy doesn't hold in the case of consciousness because all that is at stake is its own access to phenomenal properties. There is no causal category mismatch like there is with simulated rain and my physical head. If phenomenal properties are purely relational or functional, then the right kind of simulation will be conscious.

foldr 9y ago
It’s virtually a contradiction in terms to say that a phenomenal property is purely relational or functional. If it were obvious, or even plausible, that phenomenal properties were purely relational or functional, then no-one would be worrying about their implications for the philosophy of mind!
- hackinthebochs 9y ago
  It seems contradictory because of our intuitions regarding what is required for phenomenal properties, i.e. access to some non-physical substance. But these intuitions don't rule out functionalism if there's a functional explanation for why we have these intuitions. Stated more clearly: the explanandum here is the "seemings" of phenomenal properties, not the ontology of phenomenal properties. Functionalism needs to explain why the proposition "it seems to i that P" is true, where "i" indexes a conscious system and P is a phenomenal property.
  - foldr 9y ago
    I don't have any intuitions about non-physical substances. It's just not possible to even define what a phenomenal property is without making reference to non-relational or non-functional notions. Note that Searle is a physicalist, so he certainly doesn't think that non-physical properties are relevant here. > Functionalism needs to explain why the proposition "it seems to i that P" is true, where "i" indexes a conscious system and P is a phenomenal property. We aren't trying to explain why people think that they are conscious, we are trying to explain why they are conscious. A non-conscious system could believe that it was conscious, given a functionalist account of belief.
    - hackinthebochs 9y ago
      > It's just not possible to even define what a phenomenal property is without making reference to non-relational or non-functional notions. We haven't really defined it at all. The only thing we can do is reference in some manner the thing we all presumably share. We're all trying to get at the nature of that thing. >Note that Searle is a physicalist In name only. He has strange beliefs on the subject that are hard to pin down. >We aren't trying to explain why people think that they are conscious, we are trying to explain why they are conscious. This isn't a meaningful distinction due to the ambiguity in what consciousness actually is. Our usual casual talk about conscious often assume more than is warranted. In actuality, the only definite explanandum is that "it seems that [phenomenal property]". Cashing out exactly what this means, and how it is the case that "it seems that [phenomenal property]" is what properly done philosophy of mind is about. Chalmers' recent paper on the meta-problem of consciousness spells this out well: https://philpapers.org/archive/CHATMO-32.pdf https://philpapers.org/archive/CHATMO-32.pdf
      - foldr 9y ago
        >We're all trying to get at the nature of that thing. Sure, I'm not worried about defining the term 'phenomenal property'. My point is that functionalist accounts of the property of e.g. 'being in pain' are transparently not accounts of anything we can recognize as potentially being a phenomenal property. I'm therefore baffled by your suggestion that phenomenal properties might be 'purely relational or functional'. It's all very well to say that a seeming contradiction might turn out not to be a real contradiction, but in the absence of any positive argument to this effect, why assume so? You suggest that there may be a functional explanation for why we believe there's a contradiction, but that isn't any use unless you can conjoin it with an argument that there is not in fact any contradiction. >In name only. He has strange beliefs on the subject that are hard to pin down. None of Searle's arguments against functionalism rely on the premise that physicalism is false. It's perfectly clear that one could accept the full force of the Chinese room argument while being a physicalist in the strictest imaginable sense. The conclusion of the argument is that consciousness (or 'understanding') cannot be the result of merely executing a particular program. Nothing Searle says suggests that the extra ingredient needs to be something non-physical. >In actuality, the only definite explanandum is that "it seems that [phenomenal property]" There isn't any distinction between feeling pain and seeming to feel pain. Chalmers agrees on this point ("illusionism is obviously false", p. 35). In fact, section 6 of the paper is devoted to arguing against exactly what you are arguing for in your last paragraph. A solution to the metaproblem won't help very much because, as Chalmers puts it: > On my view, consciousness is real, and explaining our judgments about consciousness does not suffice to solve or dissolve the problem of consciousness.
- threatofrain 9y ago
  I see it as contradictory to saying that your velocity exists only relative to an observer, and that we can't ever observe your "fundamental" velocity. I think it's okay to have a relative view the world, which to me is the same thing as relational. Some might say that your innate properties can be summed up by graph relations to all things you have a relationship to.

foldr 9y ago

It’s virtually a contradiction in terms to say that a phenomenal property is purely relational or functional. If it were obvious, or even plausible, that phenomenal properties were purely relational or functional, then no-one would be worrying about their implications for the philosophy of mind!

hackinthebochs 9y ago
It seems contradictory because of our intuitions regarding what is required for phenomenal properties, i.e. access to some non-physical substance. But these intuitions don't rule out functionalism if there's a functional explanation for why we have these intuitions. Stated more clearly: the explanandum here is the "seemings" of phenomenal properties, not the ontology of phenomenal properties. Functionalism needs to explain why the proposition "it seems to i that P" is true, where "i" indexes a conscious system and P is a phenomenal property.
- foldr 9y ago
  I don't have any intuitions about non-physical substances. It's just not possible to even define what a phenomenal property is without making reference to non-relational or non-functional notions. Note that Searle is a physicalist, so he certainly doesn't think that non-physical properties are relevant here. > Functionalism needs to explain why the proposition "it seems to i that P" is true, where "i" indexes a conscious system and P is a phenomenal property. We aren't trying to explain why people think that they are conscious, we are trying to explain why they are conscious. A non-conscious system could believe that it was conscious, given a functionalist account of belief.
  - hackinthebochs 9y ago
    > It's just not possible to even define what a phenomenal property is without making reference to non-relational or non-functional notions. We haven't really defined it at all. The only thing we can do is reference in some manner the thing we all presumably share. We're all trying to get at the nature of that thing. >Note that Searle is a physicalist In name only. He has strange beliefs on the subject that are hard to pin down. >We aren't trying to explain why people think that they are conscious, we are trying to explain why they are conscious. This isn't a meaningful distinction due to the ambiguity in what consciousness actually is. Our usual casual talk about conscious often assume more than is warranted. In actuality, the only definite explanandum is that "it seems that [phenomenal property]". Cashing out exactly what this means, and how it is the case that "it seems that [phenomenal property]" is what properly done philosophy of mind is about. Chalmers' recent paper on the meta-problem of consciousness spells this out well: https://philpapers.org/archive/CHATMO-32.pdf https://philpapers.org/archive/CHATMO-32.pdf
    - foldr 9y ago
      >We're all trying to get at the nature of that thing. Sure, I'm not worried about defining the term 'phenomenal property'. My point is that functionalist accounts of the property of e.g. 'being in pain' are transparently not accounts of anything we can recognize as potentially being a phenomenal property. I'm therefore baffled by your suggestion that phenomenal properties might be 'purely relational or functional'. It's all very well to say that a seeming contradiction might turn out not to be a real contradiction, but in the absence of any positive argument to this effect, why assume so? You suggest that there may be a functional explanation for why we believe there's a contradiction, but that isn't any use unless you can conjoin it with an argument that there is not in fact any contradiction. >In name only. He has strange beliefs on the subject that are hard to pin down. None of Searle's arguments against functionalism rely on the premise that physicalism is false. It's perfectly clear that one could accept the full force of the Chinese room argument while being a physicalist in the strictest imaginable sense. The conclusion of the argument is that consciousness (or 'understanding') cannot be the result of merely executing a particular program. Nothing Searle says suggests that the extra ingredient needs to be something non-physical. >In actuality, the only definite explanandum is that "it seems that [phenomenal property]" There isn't any distinction between feeling pain and seeming to feel pain. Chalmers agrees on this point ("illusionism is obviously false", p. 35). In fact, section 6 of the paper is devoted to arguing against exactly what you are arguing for in your last paragraph. A solution to the metaproblem won't help very much because, as Chalmers puts it: > On my view, consciousness is real, and explaining our judgments about consciousness does not suffice to solve or dissolve the problem of consciousness.
threatofrain 9y ago
I see it as contradictory to saying that your velocity exists only relative to an observer, and that we can't ever observe your "fundamental" velocity. I think it's okay to have a relative view the world, which to me is the same thing as relational. Some might say that your innate properties can be summed up by graph relations to all things you have a relationship to.