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Admittedly, my reply was lacking necessary detail. The parallel I was trying to draw with OPEC is that, in order for a cartel to work effectively, each member

Admittedly, my reply was lacking necessary detail. The parallel I was trying to draw with OPEC is that, in order for a cartel to work effectively, each member has to adhere to the rules established by the cartel, sometimes to the short-term detriment of any individual cartel member. With OPEC, this means strict controls on the output of oil. In good times, each member seems to keep production in line with the OPEC established standards, but the minute any stress is added to the system (primarily dropping oil prices), all bets are off and we see individual members increasing their production to maintain short-term cash flow - you essentially said this same thing in your comment. It seems like your proposal would establish a cartel-like structure related to corporate tax rates. I was trying to point out the inherent fragility of this type of arraignment, especially in the EU where there are many stressors between member countries.

felipeko 9y ago
Thanks, I see the similarities now. I think the system will work only as far as you have power players that are able to punish everyone who gets out of line - by racing to the bottom and driving profits out as a punishment [1]. That's exactly what I think complaining countries should do. They're not getting any revenue now, so they are able to power play Ireland into fair taxation, and the system will be as stable as their possibility to do so. If you take into account that any country cheating will take revenue away from others (thus their reason for a high tax), they should always be able to counter, as they are now. [1] https://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/03/business/saudis-use-pain-to-pressure-opec.html https://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/03/business/saudis-use-pain-...