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> specific physical properties of the brain will turn out to be important for consciousness. But we do know something about the components of brains and they d

> specific physical properties of the brain will turn out to be important for consciousness. But we do know something about the components of brains and they don't seem to exhibit any features that cannot in principle be computed. >But everyone in this domain is guessing. Sure we're guessing, but Searle goes further to rule out potential solutions based on assumptions of specialness of brains.

foldr 9y ago
>But we do know something about the components of brains and they don't seem to exhibit any features that cannot in principle be computed. Sure, but so what? Neither do rain storms, but as Searle puts it, no-one would expect a computer simulation of a rain storm to actually make anyone wet. If conscious brains can be simulated, that in no way entails that simulations of conscious brains are themselves conscious. It seems to be a common misreading of Searle that he thinks that brains can’t be simulated on computers. The starting point of the Chinese room argument is to concede for the sake of argument that this is possible.
- hackinthebochs 9y ago
  >Neither do rain storms, but as Searle puts it, no-one would expect a computer simulation of a rain storm to actually make anyone wet. Of course not, but that's because the simulation doesn't have the right kind of causal relationship with my head to cause my head to get wet. But it might have the right kind of causal relationship with a simulated head to cause it to get wet. The analogy doesn't hold in the case of consciousness because all that is at stake is its own access to phenomenal properties. There is no causal category mismatch like there is with simulated rain and my physical head. If phenomenal properties are purely relational or functional, then the right kind of simulation will be conscious.
  - foldr 9y ago
    It’s virtually a contradiction in terms to say that a phenomenal property is purely relational or functional. If it were obvious, or even plausible, that phenomenal properties were purely relational or functional, then no-one would be worrying about their implications for the philosophy of mind!
    - hackinthebochs 9y ago
      It seems contradictory because of our intuitions regarding what is required for phenomenal properties, i.e. access to some non-physical substance. But these intuitions don't rule out functionalism if there's a functional explanation for why we have these intuitions. Stated more clearly: the explanandum here is the "seemings" of phenomenal properties, not the ontology of phenomenal properties. Functionalism needs to explain why the proposition "it seems to i that P" is true, where "i" indexes a conscious system and P is a phenomenal property.
      - foldr 9y ago
        I don't have any intuitions about non-physical substances. It's just not possible to even define what a phenomenal property is without making reference to non-relational or non-functional notions. Note that Searle is a physicalist, so he certainly doesn't think that non-physical properties are relevant here. > Functionalism needs to explain why the proposition "it seems to i that P" is true, where "i" indexes a conscious system and P is a phenomenal property. We aren't trying to explain why people think that they are conscious, we are trying to explain why they are conscious. A non-conscious system could believe that it was conscious, given a functionalist account of belief.
        hackinthebochs 9y ago
        > It's just not possible to even define what a phenomenal property is without making reference to non-relational or non-functional notions. We haven't really defined it at all. The only thing we can do is reference in some manner the thing we all presumably share. We're all trying to get at the nature of that thing. >Note that Searle is a physicalist In name only. He has strange beliefs on the subject that are hard to pin down. >We aren't trying to explain why people think that they are conscious, we are trying to explain why they are conscious. This isn't a meaningful distinction due to the ambiguity in what consciousness actually is. Our usual casual talk about conscious often assume more than is warranted. In actuality, the only definite explanandum is that "it seems that [phenomenal property]". Cashing out exactly what this means, and how it is the case that "it seems that [phenomenal property]" is what properly done philosophy of mind is about. Chalmers' recent paper on the meta-problem of consciousness spells this out well: https://philpapers.org/archive/CHATMO-32.pdf https://philpapers.org/archive/CHATMO-32.pdf

foldr 9y ago

>But we do know something about the components of brains and they don't seem to exhibit any features that cannot in principle be computed. Sure, but so what? Neither do rain storms, but as Searle puts it, no-one would expect a computer simulation of a rain storm to actually make anyone wet. If conscious brains can be simulated, that in no way entails that simulations of conscious brains are themselves conscious. It seems to be a common misreading of Searle that he thinks that brains can’t be simulated on computers. The starting point of the Chinese room argument is to concede for the sake of argument that this is possible.

hackinthebochs 9y ago
>Neither do rain storms, but as Searle puts it, no-one would expect a computer simulation of a rain storm to actually make anyone wet. Of course not, but that's because the simulation doesn't have the right kind of causal relationship with my head to cause my head to get wet. But it might have the right kind of causal relationship with a simulated head to cause it to get wet. The analogy doesn't hold in the case of consciousness because all that is at stake is its own access to phenomenal properties. There is no causal category mismatch like there is with simulated rain and my physical head. If phenomenal properties are purely relational or functional, then the right kind of simulation will be conscious.
- foldr 9y ago
  It’s virtually a contradiction in terms to say that a phenomenal property is purely relational or functional. If it were obvious, or even plausible, that phenomenal properties were purely relational or functional, then no-one would be worrying about their implications for the philosophy of mind!
  - hackinthebochs 9y ago
    It seems contradictory because of our intuitions regarding what is required for phenomenal properties, i.e. access to some non-physical substance. But these intuitions don't rule out functionalism if there's a functional explanation for why we have these intuitions. Stated more clearly: the explanandum here is the "seemings" of phenomenal properties, not the ontology of phenomenal properties. Functionalism needs to explain why the proposition "it seems to i that P" is true, where "i" indexes a conscious system and P is a phenomenal property.
    - foldr 9y ago
      I don't have any intuitions about non-physical substances. It's just not possible to even define what a phenomenal property is without making reference to non-relational or non-functional notions. Note that Searle is a physicalist, so he certainly doesn't think that non-physical properties are relevant here. > Functionalism needs to explain why the proposition "it seems to i that P" is true, where "i" indexes a conscious system and P is a phenomenal property. We aren't trying to explain why people think that they are conscious, we are trying to explain why they are conscious. A non-conscious system could believe that it was conscious, given a functionalist account of belief.
      - hackinthebochs 9y ago
        > It's just not possible to even define what a phenomenal property is without making reference to non-relational or non-functional notions. We haven't really defined it at all. The only thing we can do is reference in some manner the thing we all presumably share. We're all trying to get at the nature of that thing. >Note that Searle is a physicalist In name only. He has strange beliefs on the subject that are hard to pin down. >We aren't trying to explain why people think that they are conscious, we are trying to explain why they are conscious. This isn't a meaningful distinction due to the ambiguity in what consciousness actually is. Our usual casual talk about conscious often assume more than is warranted. In actuality, the only definite explanandum is that "it seems that [phenomenal property]". Cashing out exactly what this means, and how it is the case that "it seems that [phenomenal property]" is what properly done philosophy of mind is about. Chalmers' recent paper on the meta-problem of consciousness spells this out well: https://philpapers.org/archive/CHATMO-32.pdf https://philpapers.org/archive/CHATMO-32.pdf