6 ms·

To me that sounds more like an immediate presupposition than an argument. I don't see why I'd favor an explanation of "consciousness is computation within a spe

by apk-d 9y ago

To me that sounds more like an immediate presupposition than an argument. I don't see why I'd favor an explanation of "consciousness is computation within a special magic meat brain" over simply "consciousness is computation", at least until we determine that brains run on special meat magic, of which so far there appears to be little evidence. I'm also not entirely convinced by implicit promises that "we'll discover this later when our understanding of brains is better".

foldr 9y ago
Searle's point is that given what we currently understand about consciousness (i.e. nothing), there is no reason at all to think that consciousness will arise in any physical system that implements a particular kind of program. You talk about "magic meat brains", but one could just as well talk about "magic programs", since we have no idea how implementing a particular set of computations could give rise to conscious experience. Searle's bet is that the specific physical properties of the brain will turn out to be important for consciousness. Can we be sure of that? Of course not. But everyone in this domain is guessing.
- hackinthebochs 9y ago
  > specific physical properties of the brain will turn out to be important for consciousness. But we do know something about the components of brains and they don't seem to exhibit any features that cannot in principle be computed. >But everyone in this domain is guessing. Sure we're guessing, but Searle goes further to rule out potential solutions based on assumptions of specialness of brains.
  - foldr 9y ago
    >But we do know something about the components of brains and they don't seem to exhibit any features that cannot in principle be computed. Sure, but so what? Neither do rain storms, but as Searle puts it, no-one would expect a computer simulation of a rain storm to actually make anyone wet. If conscious brains can be simulated, that in no way entails that simulations of conscious brains are themselves conscious. It seems to be a common misreading of Searle that he thinks that brains can’t be simulated on computers. The starting point of the Chinese room argument is to concede for the sake of argument that this is possible.
    - hackinthebochs 9y ago
      >Neither do rain storms, but as Searle puts it, no-one would expect a computer simulation of a rain storm to actually make anyone wet. Of course not, but that's because the simulation doesn't have the right kind of causal relationship with my head to cause my head to get wet. But it might have the right kind of causal relationship with a simulated head to cause it to get wet. The analogy doesn't hold in the case of consciousness because all that is at stake is its own access to phenomenal properties. There is no causal category mismatch like there is with simulated rain and my physical head. If phenomenal properties are purely relational or functional, then the right kind of simulation will be conscious.
      - foldr 9y ago
        It’s virtually a contradiction in terms to say that a phenomenal property is purely relational or functional. If it were obvious, or even plausible, that phenomenal properties were purely relational or functional, then no-one would be worrying about their implications for the philosophy of mind!
        hackinthebochs 9y ago
        It seems contradictory because of our intuitions regarding what is required for phenomenal properties, i.e. access to some non-physical substance. But these intuitions don't rule out functionalism if there's a functional explanation for why we have these intuitions. Stated more clearly: the explanandum here is the "seemings" of phenomenal properties, not the ontology of phenomenal properties. Functionalism needs to explain why the proposition "it seems to i that P" is true, where "i" indexes a conscious system and P is a phenomenal property.
        foldr 9y ago
        I don't have any intuitions about non-physical substances. It's just not possible to even define what a phenomenal property is without making reference to non-relational or non-functional notions. Note that Searle is a physicalist, so he certainly doesn't think that non-physical properties are relevant here. > Functionalism needs to explain why the proposition "it seems to i that P" is true, where "i" indexes a conscious system and P is a phenomenal property. We aren't trying to explain why people think that they are conscious, we are trying to explain why they are conscious. A non-conscious system could believe that it was conscious, given a functionalist account of belief.

by apk-d 9y ago

foldr 9y ago

Searle's point is that given what we currently understand about consciousness (i.e. nothing), there is no reason at all to think that consciousness will arise in any physical system that implements a particular kind of program. You talk about "magic meat brains", but one could just as well talk about "magic programs", since we have no idea how implementing a particular set of computations could give rise to conscious experience. Searle's bet is that the specific physical properties of the brain will turn out to be important for consciousness. Can we be sure of that? Of course not. But everyone in this domain is guessing.

hackinthebochs 9y ago
> specific physical properties of the brain will turn out to be important for consciousness. But we do know something about the components of brains and they don't seem to exhibit any features that cannot in principle be computed. >But everyone in this domain is guessing. Sure we're guessing, but Searle goes further to rule out potential solutions based on assumptions of specialness of brains.
- foldr 9y ago
  >But we do know something about the components of brains and they don't seem to exhibit any features that cannot in principle be computed. Sure, but so what? Neither do rain storms, but as Searle puts it, no-one would expect a computer simulation of a rain storm to actually make anyone wet. If conscious brains can be simulated, that in no way entails that simulations of conscious brains are themselves conscious. It seems to be a common misreading of Searle that he thinks that brains can’t be simulated on computers. The starting point of the Chinese room argument is to concede for the sake of argument that this is possible.
  - hackinthebochs 9y ago
    >Neither do rain storms, but as Searle puts it, no-one would expect a computer simulation of a rain storm to actually make anyone wet. Of course not, but that's because the simulation doesn't have the right kind of causal relationship with my head to cause my head to get wet. But it might have the right kind of causal relationship with a simulated head to cause it to get wet. The analogy doesn't hold in the case of consciousness because all that is at stake is its own access to phenomenal properties. There is no causal category mismatch like there is with simulated rain and my physical head. If phenomenal properties are purely relational or functional, then the right kind of simulation will be conscious.
    - foldr 9y ago
      It’s virtually a contradiction in terms to say that a phenomenal property is purely relational or functional. If it were obvious, or even plausible, that phenomenal properties were purely relational or functional, then no-one would be worrying about their implications for the philosophy of mind!
      - hackinthebochs 9y ago
        It seems contradictory because of our intuitions regarding what is required for phenomenal properties, i.e. access to some non-physical substance. But these intuitions don't rule out functionalism if there's a functional explanation for why we have these intuitions. Stated more clearly: the explanandum here is the "seemings" of phenomenal properties, not the ontology of phenomenal properties. Functionalism needs to explain why the proposition "it seems to i that P" is true, where "i" indexes a conscious system and P is a phenomenal property.
        foldr 9y ago
        I don't have any intuitions about non-physical substances. It's just not possible to even define what a phenomenal property is without making reference to non-relational or non-functional notions. Note that Searle is a physicalist, so he certainly doesn't think that non-physical properties are relevant here. > Functionalism needs to explain why the proposition "it seems to i that P" is true, where "i" indexes a conscious system and P is a phenomenal property. We aren't trying to explain why people think that they are conscious, we are trying to explain why they are conscious. A non-conscious system could believe that it was conscious, given a functionalist account of belief.